

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 259 048

UD 024 317

AUTHOR Sussewell, Deborah Ridley
TITLE A Cross Racial Study of Double Consciousness Effects
PUB DATE 81
NOTE 159p.; Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland.
PUB TYPE Dissertations/Theses - Doctoral Dissertations (041)
-- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Blacks; Ethnicity; *Group Unity; Higher Education; Racial Attitudes; Racial Differences; *Racial Identification; Racial Relations; *Self Concept; Whites

ABSTRACT

The double consciousness model represents Black self-concept as being comprised of three primary cognitive structures: the "I," the "me," and the "we" self-referents. A study was conducted to examine three assumptions pertaining to the "we" self-referent: (1) that it reflects attitudes and behaviors developed because of Black Americans' African heritage and their oppressed status; (2) that it is more salient for Blacks than Whites; and (3) that Blacks' "we" self-referent attitudes generalize to other oppressed groups. Study subjects, 40 Black and 40 White female undergraduates, completed a questionnaire to assess their perception of self and others in regard to collectivism and participated in a two-person non-zero sum game in which both players make choices simultaneously. Results indicate that both groups behaved similarly and reported similar levels of other-orientedness and collectivism. The White females appeared to be more sensitive to situational cues in regard to cooperative behavior than the Black females. Both Blacks and Whites viewed their own group more positively than the other group; but whereas Blacks perceived the oppressed ethnic-racial groups, as a whole, as being more collective than non-oppressed ethnic groups, Whites did not, nor did Whites perceive themselves as being like their racial reference group in regard to collectivism, as the Blacks did. Because the Black and White subjects behaved similarly even though they perceived the test situation differently, these results lend only partial support to the double consciousness model. (KH)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED259048

A CROSS RACIAL STUDY OF DOUBLE
CONSCIOUSNESS EFFECTS

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

by
Deborah Ridley Sussewell

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Deborah R. Sussewell
Univ. of Mass.

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

- ☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
- ☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
- Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1981

© Copyright Deborah Ridley Sussewell 1981

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: A Cross-Racial Study of Double
Consciousness Effects

Deborah Ridley Sussewell, Doctor of Philosophy, 1981

Dissertation directed by: Forrest Tyler, Ph.D., Professor
Department of Psychology

The double consciousness model was presented as a useful way to conceptualize black self-concept. This model represents black self-concept as being comprised of three primary cognitive structures, the I, the me, and the we self-referents. The focus of the present research has been the investigation of assumptions that pertain to the nature of the we self-referent. These assumptions were: 1) the we self-referent reflects attitudes and behaviors that are repositories of Black Americans' African heritage and that stem from the oppressive status experienced by black people; 2) the we self-referent is more salient for Black Americans rather than for White Americans; and 3) the we self-referent attitudes expressed by blacks for their own racial group, generalize to other oppressed groups.

In the present study, the we self-referent was assessed attitudinally through the use of self-report instruments. These instruments measured the degree to which subjects' perceived themselves as other-oriented and/or collective. Semantic Differential ratings of 8 ethnic/racial groups

were also collected. These groups were labeled by the researcher as oppressed or nonoppressed as a function of their socioeconomic status in this country. The we self-referent was assessed behaviorally by noting the extent to which subjects chose cooperative versus competitive strategies in a task situation.

The results indicate that the 40 black females and the 40 white females attending a predominantly white university behaved similarly and reported similar levels of other-orientedness and collectivism. Further, white females appear to be more sensitive to situational cues in regard to cooperative behavior than do blacks. In terms of the attitudinal expression of the we self-referent, both blacks and whites viewed their respective group more positively than they did their racial counterpart. However, blacks perceived the oppressed ethnic/racial groups, as a whole, as being more collective than non-oppressed ethnic/racial groups; but whites did not. Also, blacks perceived themselves as being like their reference group in regard to collectivism; but whites did not. In this study the black subjects and white subjects behaved similarly even though they perceived the situation differently. Consequently, these results were interpreted as lending only partial support to the double consciousness model.

DEDICATION

To black people everywhere and to our struggle.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to the members of my dissertation committee; Drs. Marie Davidson, James Jones, Robert Steele and Dalmas Taylor. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the fine work of my research team; Maria Aceituno, Glenda Beal, Meg Casey, Carlana Guam, Nancy Kluge, Marjorie Wiltshire and Doretha Word.

I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight the support and special assistance provided to me by three individuals; Dr. Forrest Tyler, my Chairperson, Faye Belgrave, and Dr. Bernice Collins. These individuals exemplify the concept of "weness" in its highest form. Dr. Tyler not only provided me with a nurturing yet challenging environment in which to pursue my research interests, but he also unselfishly gave of his time to assist me in meeting the deadline that I set for myself. Faye Belgrave and Bernice Collins are both dear friends and colleagues. Faye served as a liaison for me while I was away on internship, and both she and Bernice supervised the daily routine of my research team during this same period. Without their time and support, this project would not have been completed by this time.

Lastly, I would like to thank my husband, Harold, and my family for their support during my graduate years. At

times it was hard for me to determine who was the student, my husband or myself. For his interest in my progress and his "sermons" for me to keep going when Murphy's Law was meeting me at each corner, provided me with much of my energy. With him, the African saying "I am because we are" was truly realized.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
DEDICATION.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	5
Section I: Self, Self-Concept and Self-Esteem.....	5
Section II: Symbolic Interactionism and its variations.....	10
Section III: Double Consciousness.....	33
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	46
METHODOLOGY.....	49
Overview.....	49
Rationale for Subject Population.....	50
Subjects.....	52
Measures.....	52
Procedure.....	57
RESULTS.....	64
DISCUSSION.....	96
APPENDICES.....	112
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Analysis of Variance of the Self/Other Scale Scores of Black Females and White Females Under Two Conditions of Racial Awareness and with a Black and a White Confederate.....	69
2. Mean Self/Other Scale Scores by Task Condition.....	70
3. Mean Ratings of Total Group Perception of Ethnic/Racial Groups by Black Females and by White Females.....	77
4. Analysis of Variance of Cooperative Choices of Black Females and White Females Under Two Conditions of Racial Awareness and with a Black Confederate and a White Confederate.....	80
5. Mean Number of Cooperative Choices in the Bargaining Task by Experimental Condition.....	81
6. A Cross Tabulation of Game Strategies by Condition.....	88
7. A Cross Tabulation of Game Strategies by Race of Confederate.....	89
8. A Cross Tabulation of Race Confederate by Perception of Task Difficulty.....	93

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Study design.....	51
2. Seating arrangement in game room.....	60
3. Mean number of cooperative choices for Black females and White females by level of racial awareness.....	83
4. Mean number of cooperative choices for Black females and White females by experimental condition.....	84
5. Mean number of cooperative choices over six trials for all subjects.....	85
6. Distribution of responses by race of confederate to the question "In retrospective which of the following goals did you pursue"?.....	90
7. Distribution of responses by black and white subjects to the question "Consider the entire task in which you have finished participating. Of the following which best describes the goal that the other player pursued?..."	92
8. Distribution of subject's responses by confederate to the following question, "Which of the following describes the extent to which it was difficult or easy to maintain your goal in view of the other player's choice?".....	94

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Given the oppressive circumstances under which Black Americans have existed in this country, it is of little wonder that the nature of black self-concept has intrigued so many social scientists. Historically, much of this intrigue has revolved around questions that pertain to the impact of negative evaluation by the white majority on Black Americans' conception of self. Consequently, the questions that have been posed by researchers are typically variants of the following question: Is the basic nature of black self-concept positive or negative? The majority of black self-concept research can be shown to endorse either the belief that blacks possess a positive sense of self or the belief that blacks possess a negative sense of self.

The theoretical progress of research on the black self has been impeded by the "pigeon-hole" nature of the questions asked. This is not to say that the above question is not important, that the variables under investigation do not cover a variety of situations or that the replication of these studies is not important. However, it does point to a narrow research focus, one that when continued

usually limits the promise of other kinds of questions pertaining to the nature of black self-concept emerging. In addition, situations such as these are typically symptomatic of contexts in which one theoretical orientation is disproportionately utilized in research over others.

The "pigeon-hole" nature of the questions asked can also be examined in light of the socio-political context in which they develop. For example, the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision ruled that the doctrine of "separate but equal" was unconstitutional and ordered that public schools desegregate. This Supreme Court decision proved to be a heated and volatile political and social issue for decades to come. One finds that during the "separate but equal" debate that the question of whether black children's self-concept was positive or negative was a central issue. Throughout the early periods of the court debate and for some years preceding the decision, black self-concept studies supporting the belief that black children possessed negative self-concepts were used to lobby for justice and integration (Jones, 1972). By the late sixties, the United States was bombarded with positive self-concept sentiments from Black Americans, (e.g. I'm black and I'm proud). With this socio-political metamorphosis of black presence, one can begin to identify studies that support the premise that blacks have a positive self-concept, (Banks, 1970; Dales & Keller, 1972; McDonald &

Gynther, 1965). Thus, one finds that despite the usefulness of the negative self-concept thesis in bringing about legal change, some social scientists began to question the validity and utility of these findings for Black Americans. This brief historical example is demonstrative of how the socio-political mood of the country and the "positive - negative" black self-concept research results are related.

Regardless of how one perceives the development of these two main bodies of black self-concept research, the case remains that the theoretical development of black self-concept has not progressed with the same vitality as have empirical studies to assess its development. The primary objectives of the presentation to follow are to examine the theoretical foundations upon which black self-concept research has been conducted and to formulate and investigate an alternative framework from which to study black self-concept.

This alternative framework is the double consciousness model. The model provides a way to view black self-concept from a non-deficit perspective. Its assumptions attempt to incorporate the experiences of Black Americans in formulating black self-concept and the situational variations that effect the nature and presentation of self-concept. In addition it attempts to incorporate an ideology that addresses aspects of Black Americans' African heritage and the philosophical thinking characteristic of people originating from

tribal cultures. More than this, the double consciousness model provides a framework from which the self-concept of all people can be conceptualized, understood and researched, while preserving the integrity of their respective societal and cultural experiences.

The present research represents an attempt to initiate empirical investigation of specific assumptions of this model. The double consciousness notion and its assumptions and theoretical development will be discussed in the following section.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The review of the literature will be presented in three parts. The first section addresses the meaning of the term self-concept and discusses the definitional difficulties that have incurred around the term's usage. The second section explores the fundamental notions and theoretical premises from which black self-concept has been studied. Finally, the third section introduces an alternative model of black self-concept and reviews relevant literature.

Section I: Self, Self-Concept and Self-Esteem

The self is that part of an individual of which he or she is consciously aware, (Hamachek, 1971). Jersild (1952) describes the self as the sum total of all that one can call his (or hers). He goes on to say that "the self includes, among other things, a system of ideas, attitudes, values, and commitments." The self is a person's total subjective environment; it is the distinctive center of experience and significance, (Jersild, 1952). It also has been used to refer 1) to the inner nature or the essential nature of man and woman, (Fromm, 1941; Maslow, 1954; Moustakas, 1956); 2) to the experiences and the content of self

awareness, (Chein, 1944); 3) to the individual known to the individual, (Raimy, 1958; Rogers, 1951, Wylie, 1961); and 4) to the individual identity and continuity of personal characters, (Erikson, 1956; Rosenberg, 1979).

As evidenced in the above statements, the self has been used to refer to an individual's inner world. Traditionally, clinical psychology has stressed the importance of the self by emphasizing how one's ability to function depends upon one's attitudes toward oneself and how such attitudes result from distinctive psychological, as well as physiological processes, (Meyers, 1969). As well as referring to the self as subject or agent, the term self also refers to an individual who is known to himself (Wylie, 1961). It is from the latter definition that one comes to understand and define self-concept. Self-concept is the objectification of self.

In spite of the inadequate development of self-concept theory, several points of agreement have emerged with respect to its nature (Wyne, 1974). First, it is generally accepted that the self-concept is learned. Second, the self-concept is believed to be centered about the bi-polar single dimension of positive-negative. Also, the self-concept is viewed as being composed of many different aspects of a person. For example, it is agreed that the self-concept includes the picture that the individual has of his or her body; the image of how others see him or her; and the feelings he or she has toward being accepted and toward his

or her skills and abilities. In addition, the self-concept is considered to be significantly related to other learnings that the individual must master to adjust to the tasks demanded by society. Lastly, it is agreed that important relationships exist between self-concept and the individual's personality.

Although researchers have come to some consensus about the nature of the self-concept, there are many issues that remain cloudy. One of these is the relationship between self-esteem and self-concept. Upon reviewing the literature on self-concept it becomes apparent that self-esteem and self-concept are used interchangeably. Consequently, much of the research that has been conducted on self-esteem may be self-concept research and vice-versa. Furthermore, the measures used to assess both self-esteem and self-concept are in many cases the same. The question then arises as to whether there is a difference between self-esteem and self-concept. To answer this question, let us examine once again the two terms' definitions. Self-concept is the totality of the individual's thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object (Rosenberg, 1979). Self-esteem is a positive or negative attitude toward the self. Self-esteem is also a dominant motive in the individual's motivational system. Both definitions imply that the words refer to attitudes, thoughts and feelings of the self as an object. However, the difference between the two is that self-esteem

is one component of self-concept. As one shall see in the following sections, the self-concept is conceptualized as the sum total of many components. One of these components is self-esteem. Therefore, self-esteem is the positive-negative component of self-concept. Because this distinction has not been strictly upheld in the literature, some studies cited in this review will refer to studies of self-esteem. However, the reader is urged to keep in mind the distinction that has been made and to understand that this is another limitation of self-concept research.

A second term that has emerged with respect to black self-concept research and that may cause confusion is identity formation. Self-concept and identity formation have often been wed in the literature of the black experience. According to Sizemore (1972), the self-concept is an aggregate of roles which give power for the attainment of identity. Thus the relationship between self-concept and identity is assumed to be crucial. Erikson (1966) maintains that identity encompasses more than what is called the self. It includes the ego's synthesizing functions which are concerned with the "genetic continuity of self-representation". The functions of cognition, integration, defenses and execution perpetuate and maintain one's idea of self as an object (Erikson, 1966).

Hence, the relationship between self-concept and identity is assumed to be interdependent. The reason why such a

relationship has been deemed important in studying the black experience can be understood in terms of Erikson's contention that identity is in one sense a struggle for ethnic survival. One person's or group's struggle may be relative to another's identity awareness and may have to do with matters of an inner emancipation from a more dominant identity (Erikson, 1966). Future discussions of black self-concept research in this review will include the concept of identity. The point to keep in mind is that these concepts are interdependent and are important in discussions of the black experience.

Various authors have contributed to social science's understanding of self-concept. The following definition (Ridley, 1976, p. 2) represents an attempt to collate these ideas and to provide a working definition of self-concept that will be used in this study:

Self-concept is what a person believes to be true about himself/herself as determined by how he/she perceives that others perceive him/her and by his/her relationship with significant others (Banks, 1970; Dinklemeyer, 1965; Mead, 1934; Rogers, 1959). The self-concept is an evaluative construct. The individual consults this construct not only in moments of choice but in daily interactions with others (Dinklemeyer, 1965; Raimy, 1948). The formation of self-concept begins immediately at birth and undergoes various molds and changes until maturity (Messer, 1971; Sizemore, 1972). The self is that mode which orients the individual in reacting to himself or herself, to others, to his or her feelings, and to situations, be they with others or alone. It is a dynamic construct composed of many referents, (physical, professional, etc.), that constantly strive to meet its potential (Rosenberg, 1979).

Section II: Symbolic Interactionism and its Variations

There are essentially four theoretical foundations from which self-concept has been studied. They are phenomenology, behaviorism, existentialism and symbolic interactionism. Of these, symbolic interactionism has been the most cited theoretical orientation in black self-concept research. The basic assumption of this theoretical orientation is that the individual's self-concept is shaped through his or her interactions with others. Furthermore, one's self-concept is perceived as being the reflection of one's perception about how one appears to others (Shrauger and Shoeneman, 1979).

Most social scientists acknowledge Charles Cooley as the father of symbolic interactionism. Cooley (1902) recognized that the social milieu from which an individual originates is key to how that individual perceives him or herself, (Hamachek, 1971). A basic assumption in Cooley's thinking was that there exists a fundamental unity between mind and society in which mind and society were considered to be aspects of the same whole, (Nobles, 1973). For Cooley (1902) the mind was a social entity and society, a mental entity. The self was viewed as being inseparable from social life and therefore involves some reference to others. In discussing this process of social reference, Cooley (1902) spoke of the "looking-glass" self. He described the looking-glass self as a self idea that appears

to have "three principle elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance; and some sort of self feeling, such as pride or moritification" (Cooley, 1902). Developmentally, the looking-glass self begins to take form in early childhood (Shrauger & Shoeneman, 1979). The self and self-concept were viewed by Cooley as structural processes that were flexible and capable of undergoing change once they had arisen. Thus, one finds that according to Cooley, the self and hence, the self-concept are most accurately conceptualized as a looking glass; a glass through which an individual internalizes as his own, information about oneself that is received from others.

In spite of Cooley's contribution to symbolic interactionism, it is George Mead who is credited as symbolic interactionism's major theorist. Mead (1934) expanded the view of self as a product of social interaction (Shrauger & Shoeneman, 1979). He noted that the fundamental process of communication required the individual to take the role of the other. The self, therefore, emerges as one comes to respond to oneself from the perspective of others (Rosenberg, 1979). Mead further stated that "the individual experiences himself as such not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs," (Mead, 1934; Rosenberg, 1979). In addition, he

proposed that the development of the ability to take the role of the other and to perceive the attitude of the other toward the perceiver was essential to the genesis of the self (Shrauger & Shoeneman, 1979). Cooley suggested that significant others comprised the reflective component of the looking-glass self, whereas, Mead expanded this view to include a generalized other, which is synonymous to one's sociocultural environment. He stated that "the process of communication obliges the individual to become an object of himself...by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself", (Rosenberg, 1979).

Mead's thesis was that the self was a social process within the person involving two analytically distinguishable phases, the I and the me. He theorized that through symbols, (shared meanings and values), individuals could stimulate other individuals and through learning a culture, a person is able to predict other people's behavior. Furthermore, he proposed that the definition of oneself as a specific role player in a given relationship was accomplished by recognizing and sharing meaning and values that others have of oneself. The me constituted the incorporation of others' attitudes and feelings about oneself. The I was the perception of oneself as reflected by the shared meanings and values of others and symbolized one's perception or feeling about the organized me. Therefore, the way one conceived the me constituted the I.

The refinement and development of the looking-glass self theory does not cease with Cooley and Mead. Ben (1967, 1972), Jones and Wisbett (1971), Kinch (1963) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) are among those who have continued to build upon or espouse symbolic interactionism.

The symbolic interactionist approach to self-concept has also proven to be most influential in the development of Black self-concept models. The following quote by Friedman (1964) captures the essence of this theoretical orientation.

...the Negro's identity is formed in a terribly unfunny funhouse, where the mirrors reflect back systematically distorted images of himself, images which he does not know are distortions, for they are the only images he has ever seen.

The following quote by Bernard Wolfe also illustrates the symbolic interactionist or looking-glass approach in studying the black self:

By a devious interracial irony, the creative Negro, far from being his own spontaneous self, may actually be dramatizing the white man's image of the "spontaneous" Negro as he really is... what we take in the singing and dancing Negro for his own self portrait may very well be a composite portrait of which the white world has slapped together haphazardly out of his own emotional leftovers and flung on the Negro... the real manufacturer of this spontaneity is the white man in the audience. (Friedman, 1964)

These quotes are exemplary of Black self-concept models that describe black people as being molded totally by the prejudices of white society. The black individual is not seen as a person, but as a reflection of white society's

negativism toward people of African descent.

In his discussion of self, Goffman (1963) perceived the Black American as a stigmatized individual. As a consequence of his/her societal status the Black American was thought to have internalized this stigma and thus to be inflicted with insurmountable guilt and shame. Baldwin best describes this sentiment:

Negroes in this country...are taught really to despise themselves from the morning their eyes open on the world. The world is white and they are black. ...The Negro child, long before he perceives this difference, has begun to react to it and be controlled by it. (Friedman, 1964)

The stigmatized individual is thus appointed at birth, with his most salient characteristic being the color of his skin. Through interaction with his environment, he internalizes sentiments of white society and "with the reflection of the looking-glass, stigmatizes himself".

In a discussion on negative identity, Friedman (1964) summarizes many of the sentiments expressed by researchers who report that blacks have negative self-concepts (Grier & Cobbs, 1968). He defines negative identity as an identity that is perversely based on those identifications and roles which at critical stages of development have been presented to the individual as being most undesirable or dangerous, and yet most real. An extension of this concept is the notion of collective negative identity, a concept that is collective in two respects. First, there is the

negative identity of an entire group. Second, the perpetrator of the negative identity is another group. Therefore, blacks internalize a particular negative identity which has been filtered from white values. It is not of his own creation and does not come out of the experiences and traditions of his own group.

Similarly, Ausubel (1967) proposes a theory of self development, whereby self-evaluations are formulated from comparisons between one's self and others. According to Ausubel, the lower class family structure is prone to ease a child's development away from the home faster than its middle class counterpart. Thus, important relationships with significant others, (e.g., the child's parents), are not fully developed or positive and complete self development is intercepted. Ausubel goes on to say that this "desatellization" is more frequent among the black population since most black people are members of the lower class.

Three assumptions underlie Ausubel's theory: 1) all behavior is motivated, 2) behavior is motivated toward maintaining or enhancing self-esteem, and 3) self-esteem is a function of status. Ausubel has identified four major sources of status: 1) family, especially the parents, 2) peers, 3) teachers and 4) significant others in the individual's environment. These status confirming agents can grant two types of status, derived and primary. Derived status is that which the child inherits from his birth into

an economic household, and primary status is assigned to those who gain status by exemplifying competencies, (it is given to the individual who has developed outstanding skills and abilities which they can perform independently from their social position or background). Primary status must be conferred by a broad segment of society and not merely by a small group of individuals (Wyne, 1974).

Ausubel (1966) proposes the following stages of self-development: ego aggrandizement, crisis ego devaluation, desatellization, and resatellization. Ego aggrandizement, which occurs between the ages of one and two and one-half years, marks a period in the child's life when he is most powerful, (e.g. members of the family attend to his or her every need). During crisis ego devaluation the child realizes that satisfying his needs is no longer his family's chief priority, and therefore, he looks for other sources of self-esteem. The child learns to regain this lost status through satellization. Satellization is similar to Freud's notion of identification, whereby the child adopts the parents' belief systems, attitudes, etc. as his or her own. Ausubel proposes six types of satellization: 1) the over dominated type, 2) the underdominated type, 3) the over protected type, 4) the under protected type, 5) the over appreciated type, and 6) the under appreciated type. These types of satellization relationships usually exist until adolescence, at which time the child experiences his second

major crisis, that of desatellization or breaking away from the satellization relationship. According to Ausubel, youth resatellize around their peer groups.

Given the societal status of blacks in this country, Ausubel feels that the ego development of blacks is influenced by a number of factors over which he or she has no control. For one thing, the black self has little chance to gain the derived status that is the cornerstone of self-esteem for all young children. Also, the black self rarely has an available and an appropriate adult satellization model. Ausubel does, however, grant the black child some of the executive competencies necessary for survival in his world.

Whereas, Ausubel sees many of the mechanisms of black survival reflecting negative self imagery, Arnez (1972) sees "the conk", "uncle-Tomming", etc. as reflecting the black man's love for self and thus, as a foundation for positive self-concept. According to Arnez (1972) it was through such acts as "Tomming" that blacks have maintained their existence in society.

William Cross presents a model of black identity formation that incorporates many of the assumptions of symbolic interactionism. What is different in this model is that as one psychologically matures the group influencing self perception and identity development changes. In his theory, Cross (1972) proposes four stages in black identity formation;

pre-encounter, encounter, immersion and internalization.

A person in the pre-encounter stage is programmed to view and think of the world as being nonblack, anti-black or the opposite of black. The behavior and basic attitudes toward the self are determined by the oppressor's logic. In this stage white America is the reference group. In the encounter stage some experiences manage to slip by or even shatter the person's current feelings about himself and his interpretations of the conditions of black in this country. In this stage, the person feels with great force what being black in America means. This stage marks a transition from white to black in one's reference group. In immersion, everything of value must be relevant to blackness, (e.g. the person behaves and feels that everything black is good). This person frequently confronts the system and the "man", behaving in such a way as to indicate that he fears neither control nor oppressive techniques, nor death. Black people serve as an individual's reference group in this stage. The black individual who focuses on issues other than himself and his own ethnic or racial group has entered the stage of internalization. This person behaves as if he has an inner security and satisfaction with himself and as if he feels a great love and compassion for all oppressed people. All oppressed people, regardless of cultural background, serve as the major reference groups and group of concern for black people in this final stage.

All of the above theories acknowledge at some level the following aspects of black self-concept: a) that black people have been victims of racism and oppression in this country, b) that these experiences have had impact on the black individual's psychological growth, and c) that there is a psychological struggle for Black Americans when trying to incorporate the values of the dominant white society and maintaining one's dignity as a member of the black race. Also, all of the above models, (except for the Cross model), make the following assumptions:

1) that an individual knows how broader society feels about his or her group, 2) that an individual accepts the societal view, 3) that an individual believes that the societal view of the group's characteristics apply to self, and 4) that an individual is critically concerned with the majority attitudes. Respectively, these are the assumption of awareness, the assumption of agreement, the assumption of personal relevance and the assumption of significance (Rosenberg, 1979). In addition, it is assumed that people who have existed under different circumstances have come to view their world through the same lenses and to accept as valid the differential rewards that have accompanied their existence. In sum, the perceived importance of white America in the molding of the black self has been a predominant theme in black self-concept models.

Morris Rosenberg (1979) and Wade Nobles (1973) are two researchers who offer models of black self-concept that preserve the basic principles of symbolic interactionism without totally relying on the majority group as the sole source for self feedback and development. A brief review of each position will be presented.

Rosenberg: Conceiving of Self

According to Rosenberg (1979), the self-concept can be partitioned into three distinguishable regions. They are the extant self, the desired self and the presenting self. The extant self is that part of the self that is concerned with how the individual sees him or herself. Rosenberg examines the substance of the extant self in terms of its content, its structure, its dimensions and its ego-extensions.

The content, or parts, of the extant self consist of societal identity and dispositions. In describing social identity, Rosenberg comments that "it is characteristic of the human mind to classify the parts of reality that enter its experience into categories and this applies to people as well as to other objects". Subsumed under the general heading of social identity are the following elements: 1) social statuses, which are universally based on social classification and self definition, such as sex, age, family status; 2) membership groups which are based

on voluntary association, similarity of belief or interest, sharing of culture, commonality of origin and physical or regional continuity. (Included in this category are ethnic identities, as well as race.); 3) "labels" which are based on the process of social labeling whereby an individual is labeled as a result of deviating from a social norm; 4) derived statuses which emerge as a result of the individual's history or biography; 5) social types which correspond to some syndrome of interests, attitudes, characteristics or habits that are socially perceived as being congruent, such as a jet setter; and 6) personal identity which refers to the individual's deepest thoughts, feelings and wishes. It must be stressed that the above elements of social identity are socially defined and are not logical, natural or scientific categories. They denote how broader society responds to people. Furthermore, since many of these elements are socially ranked and evaluated, an individual's sense of personal worth or value is to some extent contingent upon the prestige of these identity elements (Rosenberg, 1979).

Dispositions, the other aspect of the content of the extant self, refers to the individual's awareness of him or herself as a person with certain tendencies to respond to elements of his or her social experience. These tendencies may refer to attitudes, to traits, to abilities, to values, to personality, to specific habits or acts, to

likes or preferences, to "powers" or to "tendencies" in general, (Rosenberg, 1979). Overall, identity elements are more the definite and unchangeable aspects of the self-concept than are dispositions. In addition, dispositions are subject to accuracy and verifiability.

Structure and dimensions are two other substantive aspects of the extant self. Briefly stated, the self-concept is a structure whose elements are hierarchically organized in a system of self values. According to Rosenberg (1979) the self-concept may consist primarily of a social exterior or a psychological interior. He also feels that the self-concept is largely revealed by characterizing individuals in terms of the universal attitude dimensions of intensity, salience, consistency, stability, clarity, accuracy and verifiability. However, there are certain respects in which self attitudes, although not necessarily unique are distinctive. These distinct features include: 1) that the self is an important object to everyone; 2) that the self is reflexive; 3) that the self-concept is a product of certain incommunicable information; 4) that the propensity to assess and evaluate objects which enter the phenomenal field applies to the self; 5) that self attitudes give rise to an unique set of emotions, namely pride and shame; and 6) that the dimensions of accuracy and verifiability have special importance in understanding the distinctive nature of the self-concept (Rosenberg, 1979).

Ego-extension is the final major component of the extant self. Through the concept of ego-extension, Rosenberg recognizes the independent identity of those external things, people or groups, that a person may feel are a part of him or her. William James (1890) called this the Empirical Self. James (1890) defined the empirical self as all that an individual is tempted to call by the name me. He goes on to say that "in the widest possible sense, however, a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call his." For James, this included such diverse things as one's children, ancestors or reputation. Rosenberg (1970) states that the extant self-concept includes the individual's ego-extensions since they are experienced as a part of what "we" are. Yet, he is cautious to note that it becomes difficult to denote boundaries. Despite this theoretical obstacle, Rosenberg (1979) does specify characteristics of ego-extensions. They include flexibility, (they can expand or shrink), the presence of the emotions of pride or shame, and introjection. When discussing ego-extensions, Rosenberg chiefly uses familiar examples to describe the manifestation of these characteristics.

The second region of the self-concept is the desired self. The desired self is that self to which the extant self is compared. It consists of three components: the idealized image, the committed image and the moral image. The idealized image is the imaginative construct of what

type a person an individual aspires to and would like to be. The committed image as stated by Rosenberg (1979) is the self-picture "that we take seriously".

The committed image is that self perception in which the individual has invested his energies and to which he is dedicated. Like the idealized image, it represents a picture of how the individual would like to see himself. Unlike the "glorified" idealized image, the committed image represents a realistic picture of self. One's moral image is what one feels one ought to be and comprises a set of standards that reflect societal standards and values.

The third and last region of the self-concept discussed by Rosenberg (1979) is the presenting self. The presenting self is defined as a "more or less" consistent self that we elect to present to the world. Subsequently, the presenting self is not exactly the same in all situations. Rosenberg identifies three objectives in presenting certain selves. The first is the fulfillment of personal ends, goals or values. The second is the satisfaction of self consistency and self esteem motives. These ideas pertain to the acts which either confirm a pre-existing self picture or test a self hypothesis. Lastly, certain self variations are presented in order to confirm societal norms and values.

In addition to presenting his colleagues with a statement delineating the nature of the self-concept, Rosenberg

(1979) has also conceptualized four major principles underlying the functioning of the self-concept. The first is that of reflected appraisals. He feels that this principle is essential to understanding the relationship of social structure and social interaction to self-concept. Embodied within this principle are the principles of direct reflections, perceived self and generalized other. The principle of direct reflections refer to how others view us and calls attention to our need for consensual validation. Note that the direct reflections principle is an inference from Mead's (1934) theory; "to say that we see ourselves from other's viewpoints is not the same as saying that our self views correspond precisely to the views other's hold of us" (Rosenberg, 1979). The second idea embodied under the principle of reflected appraisals is the principle of "perceived self". Cooley's (1902) looking-glass self involves the imagination of our appearance to the other person and the imagination of his judgement of that appearance. The principle of the generalized other, the final principle embodied within the principle of reflected appraisals, represents the process of communication whereby the individual is obliged to adopt the attitude of the other toward the self and to see himself (or herself) from their standpoint, or perspective. This principle is synonymous to Mead's me, which is based largely on the generalized other.

The second major principle stated by Rosenberg is that of social comparison. The basic tenet behind social comparison theory is social evaluation. In other words, it is hypothesized that human beings learn about themselves by comparing themselves to others. This process leads to positive, negative or neutral self-ratings which are relative to the standards set by the individuals employed for comparison.

"To whom does one compare oneself" James (1890) posited that mature individuals compare themselves with standards set by their internalized ideal judge. On the other hand, Pettigrew (1967) hypothesizes that individuals compare themselves with referent individuals and reference groups. Rosenberg (1979) appears to agree with both James (1890) and Pettigrew (1967).

The third major principle is that of self attribution. In defining attribution, Rosenberg (1979) offers the following definition: "attribution refers to the process of inferring or perceiving the dispositional properties of entities in the environment". This principle's usefulness centers around its potential to help researchers understand the bases upon which people draw conclusions about their motives or underlying characteristics and the bases upon which people verify their tentative conclusions.

The fourth and final major principle discussed by Rosenberg (1979) is psychological centrality. Psychological

centrality holds that self-concept is an organization of parts and that these parts are hierarchically organized and interrelated in complex ways.

In summary, Rosenberg has capitalized upon symbolic interactionism in presenting his formulations of self-concept. Yet, in this process, he has detailed those aspects of self-concept that may be particularly vulnerable to "others" evaluations and has specified the various levels to which "others" may refer. Similarly, he has espoused four principles through which a symbolic interactionist type of phenomenon may take place.

In relating his conception of self-concept to black people, Rosenberg utilizes the above framework. He recognizes that many of the principles, such as reflected appraisals and social comparisons, are accompanied by assumptions that are not "generally true". In addition, he concludes that the fact that black children show satisfactory levels of self-esteem, regardless of prejudice and discrimination, does not damage the principles. In essence, Rosenberg considers his theory of self-concept to be universally applicable. The present author agrees, that within his model, Rosenberg has incorporated a variety of elements that make the model flexible, (e.g. ego extensions). This is a merit of the theory. However, making an allowance for others besides the majority to be of central importance in self-concept theory is not the same as giving the group

variable prominence in one's conceptualization. A basic assumption of the present author is that for black people the group variable is of utmost importance in self-development. It is on this issue that Rosenberg's theory, as detailed and as flexible as it may be, is viewed as incomplete.

Nobles and Africanity

The group variable is given prominence in Wade Nobles' formulation of self-concept. Nobles (1973) states that "in the establishment of self, one must join with some and depart from others," (1973). He contends that in their attempt to explore the self that most Western scholars have focused on the "departing from others" or the oppositional process of self development. Thus, most Western scholars define the self as being individually unique and different from other selves. Africanity addresses the "joining of others" aspect of self-development. It represents an appositional process and the African world view of "I am because we are and we are because I am". In this world view there is no distinction between the self and others. Nobles calls this phenomenon the extended self. The extended self is the feeling of belonging with the group as well as being in the group.

In his formulation of self-concept, Nobles wed's African and Western world views. He does so, by integrating the

African world view notion of the extended self into Mead's (1934) Western framework of the I and me. For Mead, the group reference component of the self, the we, would be accommodated in the analytical thinking of the me. However, Nobles (1973) purports that feelings of being a member of a particular group are important and should be a distinguishable referent for self, which he calls the we. Therefore, Nobles postulates that the gestalt of the self is comprised of three self-referents, the I, the me, and the we.

The dynamic character of the cognitive self structure in this theory is seen through the relationship between the self as I, the self as me, and the self as we. The consistency between the I and the me is necessary if the person is to maintain a particular self image. Given the importance of the group with respect to self development, it follows that the consistency between the self-referents, I, me and we, is of fundamental importance to the individual's conception of self. According to Nobles (1973), any discrepancy between the referents may lead to negative self-concepts. Consequently, these self-referents function collectively to form self conceptions, by gathering and sorting a conglomerate of information. For example, if information from the I is more negative and abundant than information from the we, then the self-concept of the individual may very well be negative. However, Nobles (1973) comments that such a notion may be too simplistic since there are different referent combinations for different people.

With respect to black self-concept, Nobles states that his model of self-concept suggests that people of African descent are "more inclined to adhere to the self as reflecting the principle of I am because we are, and because we are, therefore, I am". He further postulates that such people would find it extremely important to maintain a strong, positive unit relationship between the I, the me and the we self-referents. Therefore, cognitive consistency would be reflected in the positive relations among all three awareness referents of self. People who adhere to the self as viewed through the statement "I am (my) self by virtue of setting myself off and away from others, by opposing myself to others" (Nobles, 1973) are more inclined to comply with a self-organization in which the I, me, and we unit relations are weak or nonexistent. Nobles (1973) concludes that the cognitive unit relations self for African peoples are "represented by a cognitive self-organization which is extended or inclusive while that of European peoples must be described as independent or exclusive".

There is some question as to the role that heredity plays in Nobles' model. The statement that people of African descent are "more inclined to adhere to the self as reflecting the principle of I am because we are, and because we are, therefore I am" is vague. People of African descent may be "more inclined" to adhere to the extended self notion because they share the same racial (or genetic) history or

because they share a history of oppression and racism. Whatever may finally be found to be the case, there is no suggestion here that the self-concept need be genetic. Another problem with Nobles' formulation is that it relies heavily upon Mead's (1934) discussion and does not address the flaws of Mead's theory that have been noted by Shrauger and Shoeneman (1979) and Rosenberg (1979) earlier in this Chapter.

Despite these handicaps, Nobles' model is meritorious. First, his model recognizes the role of African heritage in black self-development. Similar attempts to link African customs to present Afro-American customs and values are addressed in the scholarly works of DuBois (1908), Herskovitz (1958) and Billingsley (1968). This model also places the group (the we) self referent in a primary position of importance. Lastly, Nobles has incorporated another world-view, that of African philosophy, into Western thought.

Summary

The symbolic interactionist approach to self-concept has provided the foundation from which a variety of models of black self concept have been developed. Two of the more exemplary models are those of Rosenberg and Nobles. Whereas, Rosenberg's model of self-concept represents a Western philosophical orientation to the study of self-concept, Nobles' model represents an African-Western orientation because of his emphasis on the we self-referent.

Despite their merits, each model has conceptual limitations when addressing the black self-concept. First, Nobles' (1973) description of the I, me, and we are not comprehensive enough to address the complexities of each self-referent. Furthermore, he does not address the situational demands on the black self-concept and how the configurational pattern of the self-referents may change across situations. Since he used Mead's (1934) conceptualization of self as the major point of reference, Nobles' model also inherited the flaws of symbolic interactionism. Again, those flaws include: 1) there is no consistent support from the available research that there is consistent agreement between peoples' self perception and how they are actually viewed by others and 2) there is no clear indication that self evaluations are influenced by the feedback occurring in natural situations. One criticism of symbolic interaction that Nobles did address was that of alternative means of feedback about self besides direct evaluation from significant others. Rosenberg's discussion is more comprehensive than that of Nobles and therefore tends to address more thoroughly the criticisms of symbolic interactionism. However, from the point of view of double consciousness theory, Rosenberg's model in relation to black self-concept does not adequately consider the role of racial and ethnic identity in the formation of black self-concept.

The double consciousness model is presented in the next section as an alternative framework from which to examine black self-concept. This framework attempts to address some difficulties noted in Rosenberg's and Nobles' models and to provide a more comprehensive basis from which to study the formation, the nature and the variants of black self-concept.

Section III: Double Consciousness

The basic foundation of the double consciousness model is derived from Nobles' (1973) discussion of the I, the me, and the we self-referents. Following Nobles' (1973) conceptualization, the present model considers these self-referents as the primary cognitive structures of self. The double consciousness model is also a product of Rosenberg's conceptualization of self-concept as being comprised of the extant self, the desired self, the presenting self and all of the components, principles and motives thereof. Hence, the double consciousness model is for the most part the union of Nobles' (1973) and Rosenberg's (1979) models of self-concept.¹

¹There are many overlapping constructs between Nobles and Rosenberg, such as ego-extensions. The double-consciousness model recognizes this fact. What will hopefully, become apparent is that the double consciousness model extracts the salient constructs from each model to form a new model. For example, whatever improves in Rosenberg's theory with respect to the nature of the "generalized other" or the me is assumed to carry over into the double-consciousness model.

The double consciousness model posits that an individual's primary cognitive structures influence his or her perception of the extant, presenting and desired selves. That is, the cognitive structures, of the I, the me, and the we, shape the perceptions of self. Furthermore, the I and the we influence the me.

In the double consciousness model, the I and the we take on additional meaning. The I, which according to Nobles (1973) represents the sentiment "I am because I am", is also symbolic of Western or European philosophy. In this society, Western philosophy is preserved and perpetuated by those of European descent, or White Americans. The central cognitive stance or perspective of the I self-referent is that of individualism. Included in this stance is the Darwinian notion of "survival of the fittest". Colloquial phrases symbolic of the I self-referent perspective are "be your own person" and "take care of number one".

The we self-referent symbolizes a non-Western, African philosophy. The primary cognitive perspective of this self-referent is that of collectivism or "survival of the tribe". Phrases that may best describe this sentiment are "one with the group" and "our joy is my joy and our pain is my pain". Also, the we self-referent is assumed to be most related to one's racial/ethnic group. Ego extensions as defined by Rosenberg, refer to one's family and close acquaintances. These ego extensions are the closest concepts that Rosenberg

notes that pertain to aspects of the we self-referent. In the double consciousness model the we self-referent refers not only to one's family and close acquaintances, but also to one's racial and ethnic group.

The present model assumes that individuals may utilize more than one cognitive posture in the course of their daily interactions. Consequently, there may be times when the I self-referent may be more salient than the we self-referent and when the we self-referent may be more salient than the I self-referent. In any given period, situational cues are hypothesized to influence the degree to which a particular cognitive structure will predominate. These situational cues or factors include the ethnic/racial composition of the setting and the race of the person with whom an individual is interacting.

The present model also assumes that despite the influence of situational factors on the strength of an individual's primary cognitive structures, that there is one self cognitive posture which predominates an individual's self-concept. That is, for any given person there is a core equation of their primary cognitive structures. For example, if one were to conceptualize these three referents as having beta weights, then each individual would have a unique combination of weights. The basic strength of these weights for each person would change only within a limited range. Thus, for each weight there would be a certain number of degrees

of freedom from which the strength of the referent could deviate. Consequently, one finds that situational variables influence the "weights" or "strength" on the self-referent, but without disrupting the basic equation. Also, it is postulated that everyone has a different configural relationship between their I, their me, and their we self-referents.²

The I, and me and the we self-referents are self cognitive structures that are culturally acquired and learned.³ The I self-referent is nurtured by parents, the schools, the media and all social and economic institutions that adhere to white middle class American and Western values. As with the I, the we self-referent is nurtured through positive experiences with one's racial/ethnic group. Parents, family and neighbors are assumed to be primary transmitters of we sentiments in the early stages of an individual's development. People who live under similar cultural and environmental circumstances are believed to possess a similar configural pattern of their primary cognitive structures. Therefore, black people, because of the survival pressures that they have experienced as a group, are perceived as having similar configural patterns of the I, the

²"A person's 'basic equation' can change over a period of time through constant exposure to the values of one self-referent over the other, through a significant life event, etc."

³"Learning" refers to all forms; observational, modeling, etc.

me and the we. It should be noted that the we self-referent, in spite of its ethnic/racial focus, is in general, other-oriented. It so happens that the primary other is one's ethnic/racial group.

A second factor, besides one's ethnic/racial membership, that is conjectured to have a significant impact on the degree to which the we self-referent is manifested is the individual's perceived and experienced level of oppression. This notion is an extension of the "survival of the tribe concept". In this instance, level of oppression is the key variable of affiliation for tribal membership. It denotes a broader based experiential referent, in which a group's survival and quality of life is dependent upon that group's position within American society's power structure. Persons sharing a similar position within a culture's power structure in many ways share a common destiny and common struggles. These experiences are hypothesized for members of oppressed groups to impact greatly on their sense of being, coping style and degree of affiliation for persons who share their struggle. Thus, the we self-referent is assumed to play a greater role in self objectification for the oppressed and for those who perceive themselves as oppressed, (e.g. such as members of the Ku Klux Klan). More specifically, for black people the we self-referent is assumed to be a more salient self-referent than it is for members of non-oppressed groups.

For persons more apt to have a stronger we self-referent, the we self-referent is assumed to be more predominant in situations with those of one's racial or ethnic group than with those from a different racial or ethnic group. In addition, the we self-referent is assumed to be predominant in situations with those of an oppressed ethnic group than those who are not perceived as being oppressed. Thus, in situations with other blacks, black persons tend to view themselves from a group or we self-referent orientation. Similarly, their behavior and perceptions of others will reflect the basic values of this self-referent.

The I and the we self-referents have positive and negative features for individuals. The central focus of this research is on the Black American's self-concept. Therefore, this discussion shall center only on the positive and negative tradeoffs for this group. The positive aspects of the I cognitive posture for blacks are: 1) It regulates and brings forth the survival motives of the individual. It allows the black person to view him or herself through western values and ideals and to judge him or her in terms of what it takes to survive; and 2) It enables the black individual to evaluate herself or himself by the same value system as the majority group. Negative tradeoffs of the I self-referent are: 1) The black individual may not be consciously aware of when the I orientation is operating and from what perspective self evaluation is taking place;

2) The black individual runs the risk of unconsciously cutting him or herself off from the black group when self evaluations are constantly made from this self-referent. (A major assumption of this model is that one cannot survive without the psychological support of one's ethnic/racial group.), and 3) The black individual runs the risk of viewing him or herself too harshly in terms of Western values and thus adopting destructive means to achieve an acceptable view of self, (e.g. "pushing dope", "hustling", etc.).

The positive tradeoffs with respect to the we self-referent are: 1) it regulates and brings forth feelings and survival strategies as a member of a group and 2) it provides the individual with a central group with which to identify, a group whose history and culture is relatively congruent. A negative tradeoff of the we self-referent is the possibility of becoming so immersed in the group that self-differentiation becomes difficult, if not impossible.

The double consciousness model has been developed from a concern for an alternative non-deficit framework from which to view black self-concept. The model describes the nature of black self-concept in terms of referents which are applicable and meaningful to the Afro-American experience. For this model the white middle class group is not the only norm to which other groups are compared. The double consciousness model is based on the pluralistic

notion that groups differ and that diversity among people is the norm. Therefore, within the double consciousness framework, each ethnic/racial group is expected to differ in regard to the strengths of their respective self-referents. Furthermore, each ethnic/racial group serves as a norm for the individuals of that group. Differences that arise between groups may represent differences in how these groups have organized their lives. Thus, in researching this model, the norms of each group must be taken into account.

Examples of Double Consciousness in the Literature

The idea that Black Americans utilize two major self-referents to view self, one that reflects the majority society and one that reflects the Afro-American tradition, is not new. Examples of this notion are available in the literature.

For instance, at a conference on Institutional Racism in Lanham, Maryland, (November, 1976), Dr. Ferdinand Jones presented a paper entitled "White Racism and Africanity in the Development of Afro-American Communities". In his paper he presented five factors that functioned as psychological survival processes during slavery. They were 1) genetic factors, (the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest); 2) reality testing, (the ability to assess accurately one's environment and develop those strategies that would best lend themselves to effective coping);

ego strength, (the ability of slaves to construct a society that gave prestige for some slaves and the ability to change white practices to meet the needs of black people); 4) community support systems, (slave-holders stimulated slave group development by their need for social and psychological distance); and 5) creative energies (folk tales of oral tradition, dance, etc.). From this description of black life during slavery, it becomes evident that there was clearly a black culture and an identification system among blacks. This description supports the present model in indicating that blacks during slavery not only possessed a black identity, but more importantly, the sense of their identity possessed an intrinsic quality. There was a culture that slaves brought with them and that slaves saw as valuable. Therefore, in their adptation to European culture they created a culture that not only reflected the dominant culture, but also incorporated facets of their African heritage (e.g. the Black Church and Christianity). This adaptation and preservation process is an excellent example of the meaning of double consciousness.

Another example of the duality of black self-consciousness is exemplified through philosophies of two prominent black leaders, Booker T. Washington, and W.E.B. Dubois. Washington advocated accommodation on the part of black people in which accommodation meant continued relegation to subordinate positions in society. Washington was apparently

viewing himself through the eyes of the dominant group and developed his system of self-objectification around those philosophies. One can hypothesize that the entire notion of his self help programs stemmed from his internalization that blacks were lazy and dependent and that Black Americans needed to earn their respect. DuBois challenged Washington's views in the following statement:

So far Mr. Washington apologizes for injustice, North, or South, does not rightly value the privilege of voting, belittles the emasculating effects of our brighter minds, so far as... the Nation does this we must increasingly and firmly oppose them. By every civilized and peaceful method we must strive for the rights which the world accords men. (Pinkney, 1969)

DuBois is speaking through his experiences as a black man and through his desires to be treated as a man. Through his writings, DuBois reflects the mind of the black man immersed in his culture and history. In his writings, DuBois also speaks of sorrow songs and how they depict the suffering in the black communities; as in this song, "Nobody knows the trouble I've seen". Yet, the only sense of black unity was not based on sorrow and oppression, though one would be foolish to deny its role. DuBois also highlighted the good times, the sharing times in the black community. If one can imagine these two orientations, that of Washington and DuBois, functioning almost simultaneously within the black psyche, interpreting and evaluating environmental stimuli, then one is able to picture the operation of the double consciousness model.

Yet, DuBois also wrote that self doubt and shame were central experiences in black life. "Behind the thought lies the after thought- suppose if all the world is right and we are less than men" (Friedman, 1964). Friedman (1964) suggests that the result of this thought process was an identification with the aggressor or adopting the attitudes of the generalized white view. The black man's acceptance of white man's image of himself is thought to be inextricably interwoven with the black man's acceptance of the white man's image of Africa. The following quote by DuBois provides an excellent summary of this and the above statements:

The Negro is a king of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second sight in this American world- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring oneself by the tape of the world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Friedman, 1964)

The positive-negative division of black self-concept research can also be explained in terms of the double consciousness framework. Various studies (many of them on children), have been done that have concluded that blacks have poor self-concepts, (Clark & Clark, 1947; Goodman, 1946; Stevenson & Stewart, 1958; Morland, 1966; Gitter & Satow, 1969; Stabler, Johnson & Jordon, 1971; Uwanno & Stabler, 1977). Most of these studies reach this conclusion based on racial misidentification and on expressed

preferences for white over black dolls. Setting aside the methodological problems noted by Wylie (1974), the double consciousness framework recognizes these results as expressing the I self-referent of the respondent. The black child's self-concept was seen as negative because the child was viewing himself or herself in light of white American values and standards; standards that the children in these studies may not have viewed as being applicable or attainable.⁴ On the other hand, positive self-concept studies, (McDonald & Gynther, 1965; Gregor & McPherson, 1966; Greenwald & Oppenheim, 1968; Banks, 1970; Hraba & Grant, 1970; Dales & Keller, 1972; Toomer, 1975; Goldstein, Koopman & Goldstein, 1979; Rosenberg, 1979), are seen to represent a self appraisal that reflects positive experience as a member of the black group, (the we), and to indicate that these experiences have resulted in a positive evaluation of self.

Summary

The double-consciousness model is presented as an alternative framework from which to study black self-concept. It represents the merging of two world views, that of Western and African philosophy, and of the ideas of two theorists, Rosenberg (1979) and Nobles (1973). Like most models of black self-concept, it is a grandchild of

⁴This does not eliminate the possibility of blacks having positive experiences of self through their I self-referent.

symbolic interactionism. The most important feature of this model is that it begins to address questions about the nature of black self-concept, without focusing on its positive and negative qualities with respect to the majority group. It also explores black self development by taking into consideration the many systems with which a black individual interacts.

It is hoped that this framework will aid psychologists in understanding the black self and aid clinical psychologists, in particular, in shaping effective therapeutic intervention strategies for their black clientele. Finally, it is this framework which provides a model for this study.

CHAPTER III

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The double consciousness model is essentially a model that examines the intensity of an individual's realized and perceived feelings about self as a function of oppression. Within this framework, the self-concept of Americans of European descent is hypothesized to consist primarily of an I and of a me self-referent. Similar to the Euro-American self-concept, the self-concept of Americans of African descent also consists of an I and a me self-referent. The two groups differ in that we self-referent comprises a third prominent self-referent for the Afro-American.

It was the we self-referent that was investigated in the present study. Specifically, the relative strengths of the we self-referent were assessed for Afro and for Euro-Americans. It was expected that Afro-Americans would exhibit a stronger we or other orientation than Euro-Americans. Black participants were also expected to report perceiving themselves and other groups which are socioeconomically and politically oppressed, (Hispanic Americans, Native Americans and Asian Americans) as being more other oriented or collective. Further, black participants were hypothesized to express more positive perceptions of these groups than of

White Americans and of groups which are not socioeconomic ally and politically oppressed, (Jewish American, Irish American, and Italian Americans). (Hypothesis One).

It was unclear as to whether whites would perceive blacks and oppressed groups as being more collective than White Americans and nonoppressed groups. However, White Americans were expected to perceive oppressed groups as being different from themselves with respect to collectivism and other oriented behavior, (Hypothesis Two).

It was also predicted from the double consciousness model that for minority persons the we self-referent would be more salient in situations with those of one's racial and/or ethnic group than with those from a different racial and/or ethnic group. Therefore, it was expected that when black people were required to perform a specific task they would do so in a more other-oriented fashion when they were performing the task with a black person, and in a more self-oriented fashion when performing the task with a white person. Overall, black people were expected to demonstrate more other-oriented, (cooperative), behavior than were whites. In other words, by virtue of their oppression, black people on the average, use more other-oriented strategies in approaching tasks and problem situations than do whites.

However, black people who have a heightened sense of weness were expected to behave as competitively in a task situation with a white person as would a white person in a task situation with a white or black person. In a task

situation regardless of the race and/or ethnic background of their partner, white people who have had their group self-referent heightened were not expected to behave differently than white people who have not had their group self-referent heightened (Hypothesis three).

The present study examined the double consciousness model with respect to these assertions. Specifically, this study assessed the degree to which black subjects and white subjects perceived themselves as other-oriented (via self-report measures). In addition, the use of self or other-oriented strategies was compared between black and white subjects in a task situation in which the subjects' opponent was either racially similar or dissimilar to themselves.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Overview

To evaluate the we notion of the double consciousness model, black subjects and white subjects were asked to participate in a bargaining-type task and to complete a questionnaire. The task was designed to assess the degree of cooperative behavior of subjects who performed the task with a white confederate versus those who performed the task with a black confederate. A questionnaire was used to heighten the individual's perception of her racial and ethnic self. This questionnaire was administered to the subject either before participating in the task or after participating in the task. The order or presentation of the questionnaire served as a manipulation of the subject's racial/ethnic self perception. Through such a manipulation, the strengths of the behavioral manifestations of the we self-referent (cooperativeness) under varying conditions were examined.

The design of the study was a three between-one within analysis of variance design with race of subject, race of confederate, and order of presentation of questionnaire as the between factors and task trials as the within factor

(see Figure 1). The subject's performance on the task and her responses to the questionnaire served as dependent variables.

As a result of this design, the behavioral manifestations of the we self-referent under varying situational factors and under conditions of varying degrees of racial and ethnic awareness were examined. This study provides a basis for evaluating the double consciousness notion that persons who are members of groups which have experienced social and economic oppression are more cooperative and possess a more collective orientation than those who are not members of these groups. The subject population was restricted to females in order to control for sex experimentally. All subjects received course credit for their participation.

Rationale for Subject Population

Both black subjects and white subjects participated in this study. In examining the basic premises of the double consciousness model it was crucial to address the question of whether racial differences exist in the manifestation of the we self referent. More specifically, the question of whether the we self-referent was strictly an African-based construct that was meaningful only to Americans of African descent needed to be studied. In the present study the questions regarding the we self-referent were studied in both black and white subjects.

		Trials					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
Black Subjects (A ₁)	Questionnaire Before Task (B ₁)	Black confederate (C ₁)					
		White confederate (C ₂)					
	Questionnaire After Task (B ₂)	Black confederate (C ₁)					
		White confederate (C ₂)					
	Questionnaire Before Task (B ₁)	Black confederate (C ₁)					
		White confederate (C ₂)					
White Subjects (A ₂)	Questionnaire After Task (B ₂)	Black confederate (C ₁)					
		White confederate (C ₂)					
	Questionnaire Before Task (B ₁)	Black confederate (C ₁)					
		White confederate (C ₂)					

Figure 1. Study design.

Subjects

Eighty University of Maryland undergraduate females attending classes in the Psychology Department participated in this study, (40 black subjects and 40 white subjects). The mean age for the black subjects was 19.93 years. Fifty percent of these subjects were freshman, 22.5% were sophomores 25.0% were juniors and 2.5% were seniors. The mean age for white subjects was 19.02% years. Forty-seven and one-half percent of those subjects were freshman, 32.5% were sophomores, 10% were juniors, 2.5% were seniors and 5% did not specify year in college. The results of Chi-Square analysis of race of subject by year in college revealed no significant differences between black subjects and white subjects.

Measures

Subjects were required to complete a questionnaire consisting of the following measures: the Self-Other Scale, nine Semantic Differential Scales, and the Crowne Marlowe Social Desirability Scale. The purpose of administering the questionnaire was to heighten the subject's sense of ethnic and racial awareness and to assess the subject's perception of self and of others in regard to collectivism. The order of presentation of the questionnaire served as one of the independent variables in this study. It was either presented before participating in the

experimental task (B_1) or after participating in the experimental task (B_2).

Demographic information pertaining to racial/ethnic identification, parent's occupations, neighborhood and high school racial/ethnic composition was also obtained in the questionnaire. This information was requested at the end of the questionnaire and was used to identify experimental factors that may contribute to behaviors observed in this experiment.

Self-Other Scale. This measure was used to assess the degree to which a person was "self" or "other-oriented". This 12 item scale developed by Nobles (1973) is a modified version of the Expressed Acceptance of Self and Other Scale developed by Berger (1952).

The Berger (1952) scale is actually two scales. It consists of 36 items which comprise the self acceptance scale and of 28 items which comprise the acceptance of others scale. Split-half reliabilities of the scale were computed for five groups ranging in size from 18 to 183 persons. The reliabilities of the self-acceptance scale ranged from .89 and above with the exception of one group for whom it was .75. The reliabilities of the acceptance of others scale ranged from .77 to .88. Scale validity was established in several ways. First, a group of 20 was asked to write an essay about their attitudes toward themselves, and a second group of 20 was asked to write an essay

about their attitudes toward others. Each subject also completed the self/other scale. These essays were rated by four judges in terms of a self or an other orientation. These mean ratings were correlated with the subject's self/other score. The correlation was .90 for self acceptance and .73 for acceptance of others. The scale was also given to groups that were expected to have low or high self acceptance (e.g. stutterers and nonstutterers) and that were expected to have low acceptance of others or an high acceptance of others (e.g. college students versus prisoners). Comparisons were made of these scores and the results were in the predicted direction.

Nobles' (1973) modified scale is comprised of 8 items, (28%) from Berger's (1952) acceptance of others scale and of 4 items (11%) from Berger's (1952) self acceptance scale. The items were rated on a six point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The estimated reliability of the modified scale was calculated using the Spearman Brown Formula. The reliability for the acceptance of other items was .68 and for the self acceptance items was .48 (see Appendix for scale). There are no validity data reported by Nobles (1973) on the modified scale. Validity was assumed on the basis of the original scale.

Semantic Differential. The purpose of this measure was to assess the meaning that the respondent attached to a stimulus word. Modeled after Osgood's (1957) Semantic

Differential Scale, this scale consists of pairs of bipolar adjectives that are separated by a seven point Likert scale. The stimulus words used were Myself, Black Americans, White Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, Italian Americans, and Irish Americans. In addition to a global score on this scale, each respondent received an activity, an evaluation, a potency and a group score. Of the four subscales, the group (or collective) subscale was used to assess self-collectivism and perception of collectivism in others. (See Appendix J for the Scale.)

Social Desirability Scale. The Social Desirability Scale developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1964) consists of 33 items to which the respondent is to answer true or false. This scale attempts to identify individuals who describe themselves in favorable, socially desirable terms in order to achieve approval from others. The scale's test-retest reliability is .88 and its internal consistency (Kruider-Richardson 20) is .88. Test norms were established on a sample of 1400 students in introductory psychology courses at Ohio State University. The scale has also been administered to psychotic populations, to prison populations and to students at other universities. Scale validity was supported through confirmation of hypotheses in experimental settings. (See Appendix J for the Scale.)

Task: Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG)

The Prisoners Dilemma Game was the bargaining task chosen to assess subjects' degree of cooperativeness. This game, developed by Rapoport (1967), is a two person non-zero sum game in which both players make choices simultaneously. A player's gains and losses are determined by her individual choices, as well as by the choices of her partner.

The subjects played a modified version of PDG for 60 trials (Kelly & Stahelski, 1970). The payoff matrix used by Kelly and Stahelski (1970) was used in the present study. The payoff matrix was used as follows:

		Player B	
		Green	Red
Player A	Green	(+5) +5	(-10) +10
	Red	(+10) -10	(-5) -5

The circled values in each cell are the payoffs for Player A and the uncircled values those for Player B. For this study the subject was always Player A and the confederate was Player B. The subject played with either a black or with a white female confederate.

When a player chose a green or red response she was providing information about her tendency to be self interested or mutually interested. The subject made a red choice

if she desired to maximize her own gain and/or if she did not trust the other player. The subject made a green choice if she desired to work toward mutual gains for both players and/or if she trusted that the other player would also choose green.

Several measures were administered during the game. They were a pre-game questionnaire, a game questionnaire and a post-game questionnaire (Kline, 1973). The purpose of these measures was to assess the subject's strategy during the game. (See Appendix J for questionnaire.)

Procedure

Two rooms were used in this study. One room, the briefing room was used to inform the subject about the study, to obtain experimental consent from the subject, to administer the questionnaire, and to debrief the subject. This room was also the room listed on the subject sign-up sheet located in the psychology department. The signs Interaction and Please be seated were hung on the door to this room. A chair was placed outside the room, by the door, for the subject. The second room was the game room. Two chairs were placed outside of the game room. One chair was for a female confederate and other chair was for the subject. The confederate was always seated in the chair closest to the door of the game room.

When the subject arrived at the briefing room the experimenter was waiting inside the briefing room. Two black

females and two white females served as experimenters in this study. The experimenter greeted the subject and confirmed that the subject was there for the experiment titled Interaction. After the subject and the experimenter entered the room and were seated, the experimenter recited the following cover story:

Psychologists have found that behavior in interpersonal negotiations and in other bargaining situations can be influenced by several factors: values, attitudes toward the other person and attitudes toward oneself. The purpose of this study is to provide better validation for these effects. Specifically, we are not only interested in the relationship between bargaining and values and attitudes, we would also like to understand the relationship between values and attitudes. To determine these effects all individuals will be asked to play a game with another player, as well as to indicate their values and attitudes on a paper and pencil questionnaire.

Are there any questions?

At this time the subject was given the experimental consent form. The subject was instructed to read the form and then to sign it if she had no further questions.

There were 4 conditions to which black subjects and white subjects were randomly assigned. They were 1) to first answer the questionnaire and then play the PD game with a black confederate (B_1C_1); 2) to first answer the questionnaire and then play the PD game with a white confederate (B_1C_2); 3) to first play the PD game with a black confederate (B_2C_1) and then answer the questionnaire; and 4) to first play the PD game with a white confederate and then answer the questionnaire (B_2C_2).

After the consent form was signed, subjects in the B₂ game first condition were given the following instructions by the experimenter, "If there are no further questions, let's begin by answering this questionnaire." If the subject had no questions the word "further" was not included in the experimenter's statement.

Game first Condition. The experimenter escorted the subject down the hall to the game room. Awaiting the subject and the experimenter was the confederate. The experimenter then said the following: "(the subject's name) this is (confederate's name). You two will be playing the game together". The subject and the confederate greeted one another. The experimenter then opened the door of the game room, instructing the players to go in and to have a seat. The confederate, since she was sitting closest to the door, would enter the room first. The confederate would always sit in the chair for Player B, leaving the seat for player A for the subject. Please refer to Figure 2 for the layout of the game room.

Once everyone was inside the room and seated the following instructions were given by the experimenter:

The two of you are going to be engaged in a task. You will be seated so that you cannot see each other, because it is of the essence that you not communicate with each other in any form whatsoever. The task is concerned with bargaining between individuals. The two of you will be engaged in this task together. It has certain outcomes and you cannot by yourself control the specific outcome for a given round. Rather, the outcome will




Figure 2. Seating arrangement in game room.

depend on what the other person does, as well as on what you do.

The rules are as follows: You are person A and you are person B. In front of you are two cards, one green card and one red card. On any given round each of you must hold up either a green card or a red card, so that I can see it. Any decision is final. That is, you may not change your mind once you have chosen a card for any given round. The outcomes resulting from choices are indicated on the rule sheet in front of you.

1. If both of you hold up the green card simultaneously, each of you wins 5 points.
2. If both of you hold up the red card simultaneously, each of you loses 5 points.
3. If one of you holds up the red card and the other holds up the green card, the person who holds up the red card wins 10 points and the person who held up the green card loses 10 points.

After each round I will read off the number of points lost and gained by each person. The reason I will read off the choices instead of you both looking at each other's choices is to prevent any type of communication between the two of you. Even if you are going to hold up the same card for consecutive trials put your arm and card down between each round. As soon as I have announced the scores for each round you may hold up one of the two cards as soon as you like. Are there any questions?

Let's try a few practice trials. Person A, what happens if both of you hold up red cards? (E waited for correct response). Person B, what happens if both of you hold up green cards? (E waited for correct response.) Person A, what happens if one of you holds up the red card and the other person holds up the green card? (E waited for correct response).

Okay, before we begin would you both please complete this questionnaire. (The E hands each person a pre-game questionnaire. After the questionnaire has been completed and collected the experimenter says) "Lets begin. Your first choice please".

After each choice the E announces points earned or lost. The confederate's choices were pre-determined. A dot on the score sheet used by E under the column for Player B indicated a red choice for the confederate. A blank grid on the score sheet under the column for Player B indicated a green choice for the confederate. Regardless of what the confederate actually chose, the E followed the markings on the score sheet.

After 10 choices or a trial, the E announced each player's score. She said "Player A you have _____ points and Player B you have _____ points". The players were given the game questionnaire to complete after each group of 10 choices. Sixty choices were made during the game, which is the same as six trials.

After the sixth trial and the completion of the last game questionnaire, the post-game questionnaire was administered. After this questionnaire was completed and collected the experimenter said the following:

Now I would like for you two to complete a questionnaire. Player A come with me and you can answer the questionnaire in room 2122. Player B you will answer the questionnaire in here. I will return in a few minutes to give you the questionnaire.

The E and the subject would leave for the briefing room. Once there the E gave the subject the questionnaire saying "Please answer this questionnaire. Directions are provided on the front. When you have completed the questionnaire, please open the door and I will come in and debrief you."

For the debriefing, the E followed the format of the debriefing questionnaire. (See Appendix)

Questionnaire first Condition. For this condition the E said the following after giving the cover story: "If there are no further questions, let's begin by answering this questionnaire." The E then administered the questionnaire providing the following instructions: "Directions are provided on the front. When you have completed the questionnaire please open the door and I will come in and escort you to the game room."

Once at the game room, the same procedure as in the game first condition was followed. After the post-game questionnaire was administered, then E said, "Thank you both for participating. I will debrief you both individually. Player A, will you come with me and I will debrief you. Player B, I will return shortly to debrief you." (See Appendix J for the debriefing form.)

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Subject Demographic Data

The amount of contact that an individual has with his or her racial group and the amount of contact that an individual has with other racial groups, are hypothesized to influence the degree to which that person's self-referents are manifested in various situations. In order to provide some perspective on the amount of interracial contact of the subjects, information was collected in regard to their length of neighborhood residency, neighborhood racial composition, high school racial composition and parental occupations.

The mean length of residence in their neighborhood was 6.88 years for blacks and 8.51 years for whites. A t-test analysis of these means reveals no significant differences in stability of residence for black subjects and for white subjects.

There are no normative data with which to compare the racial experiential base of the black females and white females in this study. Consequently, no statement can be made regarding the amount of cross racial contact of the subjects in this study as compared to the average degree of interracial contact of Black female and White female

Americans. However, the neighborhood and the high school racial composition data collected suggested that these black females appear to have more contact with White Americans than these white females have with Black Americans. The mean percentage of whites residing in their neighborhood was 46.05% for blacks and was 74.79% for whites. This difference in percentage for black subjects and for white subjects is statistically significant, ($t = 2.02$, $df = 79$, $p \leq .05$). The percentage of Asians and Hispanics reported to be residing in their neighborhood was 1.95% and 4.72%, respectively for blacks and 5.10% and 2.89% respectively for whites. These differences in percentage were not statistically significant.

The racial/ethnic distribution for high school composition is similar to that of residency. On the average, blacks report having a larger number of whites in their high school than whites report of blacks. White subjects reported their high school to have been 79.39% White, 18.60% Black, 3.23% Hispanic and 1.17% Asian. Black subjects reported their high school to have been, on the average, 54.16% White, 40.2% Black, 3.13% Hispanic and 2.3% Asian. The differences in the percentage of blacks and of whites attending their high school are statistically significant for the two groups. There was no information collected regarding the public or the private status of the subjects' high school.

Hollingshead's (1947) occupational index was used to categorize parental occupation into seven categories:

1) higher executives, proprietors of large concerns and major professional, 2) business managers, proprietors of medium sized businesses and lesser professionals, 3) administrative personnel, small independent businesses and major professionals, 4) clerical and sales workers, technicians and owners of little businesses, 5) skilled manual employees, 6) machine operators and semi-skilled employees and 7) unskilled employees. Two Chi-Square analyses were performed, one to determine whether black subjects' mothers' occupation differed significantly from those of white subjects' mothers'. The other was to determine whether black subjects' fathers' occupation differed significantly from those of white subjects' fathers. Such information would serve to explain further the experiential similarities and differences between black subjects and white subjects.

Analysis of mothers' occupation for blacks and for whites indicate that the types of occupations reported for their mothers did not differ significantly, (see Appendix A). However, significant differences were found in regard to analysis of fathers' occupation, ($X^2 = 21.0$, $df = 6$, $p \leq .01$). The results indicated that there are more black fathers than white fathers in lesser professional jobs, (the second highest occupational category), and in skilled manual jobs, (see Appendix B).

In summary, the sample of black subjects and of white subjects in this study are similar in age and in year of college. Their stability in regard to length of neighborhood residency is also comparable. However, these two groups differ with respect to the degree of interracial contact that they reported in regard to neighborhood and high school racial composition. Overall, blacks report having more contact with whites than whites report having with blacks. Also, more white fathers' occupations were represented in the major and minor professions, whereas more black fathers were represented in the lesser and skilled manual professions. There were no differences in the occupations of the mothers of black subjects and white subjects.

These differences should be considered in reviewing the results of the study. These results suggest that the black subjects have had the opportunity to experience a higher degree of acculturation of White American values and self-orientation. According to the double consciousness model the degree to which the we orientation is manifested would tend to be lower for this group of black subjects whose interracial contacts with White American, are significantly higher. Therefore, it is expected that the manifestation of the we self-referent would be somewhat depressed for this group of black subjects.

Summary of Scale Analyses

Social desirability was assessed for each subject. It was expected to be a possible contributor to the outcome of questionnaire responses, and of task performance. Correlational analyses of social desirability data with the Self/Other Scale and with the number of cooperative choices made by subjects revealed near zero correlations. Therefore, social desirability was not considered to be significantly related to questionnaire responses or to number of cooperative choices.

Information was also sought regarding the subject's self perception of other-orientedness under various conditions. Therefore, a three between (race of subject, race of confederate and order of playing the game), analysis of variance was performed using the subject's ratings on the self-other scale as the dependent variable (see Tables 1 and 2).

The results of this analysis were not significant at the .05 level. However, there were two sources of variation significant at the .10 level. First, there was a trend for the order of presentation of the questionnaire main effect. Subjects reported a more other-oriented disposition when completing the scale before performing the task. Second, there was a trend for a three-way interaction between race of subject, race of confederate, and order of questionnaire. Subjects rated themselves relatively consistently on other-orientedness except in one condition. This condition was

Table 1

Analysis of Variance of the Self/Other Scale Scores of Black Females^a and White Females^a under Two conditions of Racial Awareness and with a Black Confederate and with a White Confederate

Source	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	F
Race	1	3.46	.10
Order	1	111.96	3.37*
Confederate	1	34.12	1.04
Race x Order	1	.03	--
Race x Confederate	1	45.96	1.40
Order x Confederate	1	2.68	.08
Race x Order x Confederate	1	92.98	2.83*
Error	72	32.88	

^a $\underline{n} = 40$

* $p \leq .10$

Table 2

Mean Self/Other Scale
Scores by Task Condition

Condition	Mean
Black subject-black confederate Order 1	51.60
Black subject-black confederate Order 2	55.80
Black subject-white confederate Order 1	53.60
Black subject-white confederate Order 2	54.20
White subject-black confederate Order 1	54.90
White subject-black confederate Order 2	54.70
White subject-white confederate Order 1	49.70
White subject-white confederate Order 2	54.40

for white subjects who had their racial awareness heightened prior to performing the task with a white confederate. These subjects rated themselves as being less other-oriented than did the other subjects. However, they later became the group of subjects who exhibited the most cooperative behavior when performing the task.

In summary, two trends were noted that pertain to self perception of other-orientedness. They were: 1) subjects reported a more other-oriented disposition when completing the Self/Other scale after performing the task than when completing the scale before performing the task, and 2) white subjects who had their racial awareness heightened (completed the scale) prior to performing the task with a white confederate tended to rate themselves as being less other-oriented than did the other subjects.

To make extensive inferences as to the relationship between self-perception and situational cues, given that these results did not reach the desired level of significance, would be misleading. The fact that this analysis did not reach significance indicates that the self perceptions of other orientedness for black participants and white participants are relatively the same, for the most part, and are consistent across situations. However, the presence of these trends suggests directions for future research. For instance, both findings raise questions concerning the impact of interracial contact on an individual's attitudes and the impact of heightening racial awareness on attitudes toward self and others.

Hypothesis One: Black Subjects' Perceptions of Groups.

It was expected that black subjects would perceive themselves and other oppressed groups as being more other-oriented. A collectivism rating, synonymous to the group subscale score of the Semantic Differential, was used to assess black subjects' perception of other-orientedness. Subjects were requested to rate their self perception of collectivism, (the Myself Semantic Differential), as well as their perception of collectivism of other racial/ethnic groups. These groups were categorized by the researcher as oppressed or nonoppressed according to their socio-political and economic status in America. The oppressed groups were Black American, Hispanic American, Native American, and Asian American. The nonoppressed groups were White American, Italian American, Jewish American and Irish American. In total, black subjects completed nine Semantic Differential scales (thus, 9 ratings of collectivism); one for themselves, one for their racial group and one for each of the seven other groups. T-test analyses were performed between oppressed and nonoppressed pairs to determine whether the differences in the mean collective ratings for the groups were statistically significant. A t-test analysis was also performed between the mean of the combined ratings of collectivism of all the oppressed groups and those of all the nonoppressed groups.

Overall, black subjects perceived oppressed groups as being more collective than nonoppressed groups ($t = 2.81$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .05$). In addition, the individual ratings of collectivism of the oppressed groups were higher than those of nonoppressed groups. Of the comparisons made between the mean collective ratings of the oppressed groups and those of the nonoppressed groups only four achieved statistical significance, (see Appendix C). Another comparison was made to determine whether black subjects rated themselves differently in regard to collectivism than they rated Black Americans or White Americans. The results indicate that black subjects rated themselves and Black Americans, as a group, similarly in regard to collectivism. However, they rated their self-perception of collectivism significantly higher than they rated that of White Americans. ($t = 2.46$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .05$).

Correlational analyses were performed to ascertain whether black subjects' perception of their degree of collectivism was related to their perception of collectivism for other groups. The correlational pattern of the collectivism ratings of the eight ethnic/racial groups suggests that black subjects' perceptions of themselves and of other Black Americans are unrelated to their perception of other groups. However, black subjects tended to view non-black groups as being similar to each other with respect to collectivism, (see Appendix D).

In sum, partial support was found for the hypothesis that Black Americans perceive themselves and other oppressed groups as being more other oriented or collective. Black females in this study perceived oppressed groups as more collective than nonoppressed groups. When the mean collective ratings of individual groups were compared, this broad pattern of oppressed groups being rated higher than nonoppressed groups held. The majority of these comparisons, however, were not statistically significant. Yet, black subjects' self perceptions of collectivism were significantly higher than their perception of collectivism of White Americans and was not significantly different from their perception of collectivism of Black Americans as a group.

Hypothesis Two: White Subjects' Perception of Groups.

It was expected that White Americans would perceive oppressed ethnic groups as being different from themselves in regard to collectivism. To investigate this hypothesis, the same type of analyses were performed as was the case for black subjects. Namely, t-test analyses were performed between oppressed and nonoppressed pairs and between the combined collectivism rating for the nonoppressed groups.

Nonoppressed groups tended to receive higher collectivism ratings from white subjects than did oppressed groups. These comparisons were not statistically significant (see Appendix E). These subjects' self-perceptions of collectivism

were significantly higher than their perceptions of collectivism for White Americans as group, ($t = 2.97$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .05$) and for Black Americans as a group, ($t = 1.95$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .01$) (see Appendix E).

Correlational analyses were also performed to ascertain whether white subjects' perception of collectivism were related to their perceptions of collectivism for other groups. The correlational pattern of collective ratings by white females indicated that the white participants' self perceptions of collectivism were unrelated to perceptions of collectivism for most other groups. This pattern also indicated that the degree of collectivism that they perceived for White Americans and for other groups was related (see Appendix F).

In sum, white participants did not perceive oppressed and nonoppressed groups to be significantly different in regard to collectivism. However, the results of the correlational and t-test analyses support the notion that the white participants' self perceptions of collectivism tend to be higher than their perception of collectivism of White Americans as a group.

Supplementary Findings Relevant to Hypotheses One and

Two. T-test analyses were performed to investigate whether white subjects and black subjects would assign higher or lower ratings of collectivism for different groups. No

significant differences were found, (see Appendix G).⁵

T-test analyses were also performed to determine whether black subjects' and white subjects' total Semantic Differential ratings of self and of other groups differed. For each ethnic/racial group, the total perception rating consisted of the combined rating of the four subscales of the Semantic Differential that were outlined in the previous chapter, (evaluation, activity, potency and group subscales). The results of these comparisons indicate that black females perceived Black Americans more positively than they do White Americans ($t = 2.31$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .05$) and that white females perceive White Americans more positively than they do Black Americans, $t = 2.12$, $df = 39$, $p \leq .05$). Furthermore, when cross race comparisons were made in regard to total self perception, (Myself Semantic Differential), black females self perceptions were more positive than that of white females, ($t = 2.07$, $df = 77$, $p \leq .05$), (see Table 3).

The supplementary findings indicate that black subjects' and white subjects' perceptions of self and of their racial group differs from their perception of other ethnic/racial groups. The black females and white females in this study demonstrated in-group loyalty by rating their racial group

⁵Since none of these comparisons or mean ratings yielded significant differences, t-test analyses were also performed between Black subjects and White subjects on their ratings of the "collective-individualistic" items of the Myself Semantic Differential. However, no significant difference was found even on this single item which focuses most directly on each subject's perception of collectivism.

more positively than they rated other groups. However, there was no support for the notion that black subjects' and white subjects' perceptions of other groups were related to the groups' ascribed societal status of oppressed or nonoppressed.

Hypothesis Three: Game Results. The double consciousness model posits that Black Americans are more collectivism-oriented than are White Americans. This difference in degree of collectivism is attributed to the relative strength of the we self-referent for blacks as opposed to its strength for whites. Further, the strength of the behavioral manifestation of the we self-referent is influenced by situational variables, such as race of the person with whom an individual is interacting. Therefore, in a bargaining type situation, as was the case in this experiment, black subjects were expected to behave more cooperatively than white subjects. Black subjects were also expected to perform the task in a more other-oriented fashion with a black person and in a more self-oriented fashion with a white person.

Another variable hypothesized to influence the degree to which other oriented behavior is exhibited is the level of racial awareness of the individual. In this study racial awareness was heightened by having subjects (half of them) answer the Semantic Differential questionnaire before performing the bargaining task. The other subjects answered the questionnaire after performing the task. Under the

condition of having their racial awareness heightened, black subjects were expected to perform the task in a more other-oriented fashion when performing it with a black person and in a more self-oriented fashion when performing it with a white person. Furthermore, in the latter cross race condition, blacks were expected to perform the task as competitively as whites. White subjects were expected to be equally competitive regardless of the race of the confederate.

To test these hypotheses, a three between (race of subject, race of confederate, and order of presentation of the questionnaire) - one within (task trials) analysis of variance was performed on the number of cooperative choices made by each subject (see Table 4). The results of this analysis indicate that overall whites were as cooperative as blacks. That is, there was no significant main effect for race in regard to number of cooperative choices (see Tables 4 and 5). Black subjects and white subjects responded differently to the manipulation of racial awareness, as evidenced by the significant interaction between subjects' race and order of presentation of the questionnaire, ($F = 49$, $df = 1$, $p \leq .05$). White subjects whose racial awareness had been heightened prior to task performance were more cooperative than their black counterparts, and more cooperative than white subjects who performed the task before having their racial awareness heightened. Thus, for white subjects

the manipulation of level of racial awareness significantly influenced their level of cooperation. However, regardless of their level of racial awareness or the race of the person with whom they were interacting, black subjects' level of cooperation was about the same. Thus, unlike the prediction, whites changed in cooperation with a change in conditions. This was not the case for black subjects. Instead, black subjects' level of cooperation was relatively constant (see Figure 3 and 4).

Lastly, for this three-between one within analysis there was a main effect for trials. Examination of the mean number of cooperative choices for all subjects from trial one to trial six revealed an alternating pattern from a higher number of cooperative choices in one trial to a lower number of cooperative choices for the next trial. For instance, on the average, subjects made more cooperative choices during the first 10 rounds (or trial one) and fewer cooperative choices during the second 10 rounds (or trial two). On trial three they made more cooperative choices than they did on trial two. Yet on trial four, they made fewer cooperative choices than on trial three. This alternating pattern from more to less cooperative choices continued through trial six. A trend analysis of the means across the six trials indicated no significant differences in the mean number of cooperative choices from one trial to the next (Figure 5). Furthermore, examination of the random





Figure 4. Mean number of cooperative choices for Black females and White females by experimental condition.




Figure 5. Mean number of cooperative choices over six trials (T) for all subjects.

game strategy played by the confederate revealed no pattern of cooperative versus competitive choices from trial one to trial six. The results of the trend analysis in view of the random playing strategy of the confederate suggest that the significant main effect for trials is a reflection of how the subjects strategized across game trials. That is, subjects appeared to alternate systematically from one trial to the next in their level of cooperation. This suggests 1) that subjects may not have figured out that there was an overall pattern of advantage; 2) that they may not have known how to establish such a pattern; and 3) that they may have been unable to decide which goal to choose to seek an advantage (or cooperation).

Supplementary game analyses. The post-game questionnaire was designed to ascertain information that could be used to understand further the game process. Consequently, items of the post-game questionnaire were analyzed. Specifically, three two-way Chi-Square analyses were performed for each post-game questionnaire item. They were race of confederate by item response (CI), race of subject by item response (SI), and condition by item response (CDI).

For the question, "In retrospect, which of the following goals did you pursue? That is, which of the following best describes the goal you actually pursued?", significant differences were found when goals were analyzed by condition (CDI), ($\chi^2 = 30.96$, $df = 14$, $p \leq .01$) and when goals were

analyzed by race of confederate (CI), ($X^2 = 9.96$, $df = 2$, $p \leq .01$), (see Tables 6 and 7 and Figure 6). For this item, subjects could choose one of three goals: 1) to work for mutual gains, 2) to work for self gains, or 3) to work to maximize self gains and to minimize the other person's gains. The significant CI chi-square analysis indicated that subjects used more competitive strategies with the white confederate than with the black confederate. The significant CDI chi-square analysis indicated that subjects tended to use a greater variety of strategies when performing the task with a white confederate than with a black confederate. When playing with the black confederate, subjects tended to choose either to maximize their gains only or to work for mutual gains. The race of subject by item response in chi-square analysis performed on this question was not significant. Therefore, whites and blacks indicated similar goals during the game.

Another question asked on the post-game questionnaire was, "Consider the entire task in which you have just finished participating. Which of the following best describes the goal the other player pursued?". The same goals as stated for the previous question were the ones from which the subjects could choose for this question. They were: 1) to work for mutual gains, 2) to work for self gains, or 3) to work to maximize self gains and to minimize the other person's gains. When item responses were analyzed by race of

Table 6
A Cross Tabulation of Game Strategies
by Condition

Condition	Game Strategy		
	Maximize Own Gains	Mutual Gains	Maximize Own Gains & Minimize Other's Gains
Black subject-black confederate-order 1	2	6	2
Black subject-black confederate-order 2	8	4	0
Black subject-white confederate-order 1	3	5	2
Black subject-white confederate-order 2	2	2	6
White subject-black confederate-order 1	3	7	0
White subject-black confederate order 1	5	5	0
White subject-white confederate order 1	4	6	0
White subject-white confederate-order 2	3	2	5

$$\chi^2 = 30.96, df = 14, p \leq .01$$

Table 7

A Cross Tabulation of Game Strategies
by Race of Confederate

Race of Confederate	Game Strategy		
	Maximize Own Gains	Mutual Gains	Maximize Own Gain & Minimize Other Gains
Black	16	22	2
White	10	15	13

$$\chi^2 = 9.96, df = 2, p \leq .01$$




Figure 6. Distribution of responses by race of confederate to the question, "In retrospect, which of the following goals did you pursue?".

subject a significant chi-square analysis resulted ($X^2 = 4.50$, $df = 2$, $p \leq .05$). The results indicated that black subjects perceived the confederate, regardless of race as pursuing a more competitively oriented goal than did white subjects (see Figure 7). There were no significant differences in the subject's perception of the other player's game strategy when the responses were analyzed by race of confederate or by task condition.

A third post-game questionnaire item for which a significant chi-square was obtained was "Which of the following describes the extent to which it was difficult or easy to maintain your original goal in view of the other player's choices." The subject was to rate task difficulty from 1 to 5, with one being not difficult and 5 being extremely difficult. The significant chi-square analysis involved ratings of task difficulty by race of confederate. The results indicate that subjects found it to be either more difficult or easier to maintain their original goal with a white confederate than with a black confederate (see Table 8 and Figure 8). There were no differences in how blacks and in how whites responded to this question. Furthermore, there were no differences reported in task difficulty according to task condition.

In sum, post-questionnaire analyses indicate that the white confederate is perceived as being more competitive than the black confederate. Further, the subjects thought




Figure 7. Distribution of responses by Black and by White subjects to the question, "Consider the entire task in which you have just finished participating. Of the following which best describes the goal that the other player pursued?".

Table 8

A Cross Tabulation of Race of Confederate
by Perception of Task Difficulty

Race of Confederate	Ratings				
	Very easy		Neither easy nor Difficult	Very Difficult	
	1	2	3	4	5
Black ^a	7	6	18	6	3
White ^a	4	14	7	11	4
Total	11	20	25	17	7

^a $\underline{n} = 40$

$\chi^2 = 10.47, df = 4, p \leq .05$




Figure 8. Distribution of subjects' responses by confederate to the following question, "Which of the following describes the extent to which it was difficult or easy to maintain your goal in view of the other player's choice?".

that it was either more difficult or easier to maintain their strategy with the white confederate. Whereas, perceptions of task difficulty in playing with a black confederate are, for the most part, normally distributed, perceptions of task difficulty with a white confederate are bimodal. Lastly, black subjects perceived the confederate, regardless of race as pursuing a more competitive strategy.

An analysis was also performed to determine whether black subjects and white subjects played the game differently depending on whether the experimenter was white or the experimenter was black. No significant differences were found (see Appendix H and I).

In summary, the supplementary game analysis served to clarify the process behind observed task behavior. It was discovered that 1) the white confederate is perceived as being more competitive than the black confederate, 2) subjects felt that it was either more difficult or easier to maintain their strategy with the white confederate, and 3) black subjects regardless of race of confederate pursued a more competitive strategy. Also, race of experimenter and social desirability were not significant contributors to task performance.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Conceptual Overview

The we self-referent of the double consciousness model has been examined in relation to its behavioral and attitudinal characteristics for black subjects and for white subjects. Central to the notion of double consciousness is the idea that Black American's feelings of other orientedness and acts of cooperativeness are more salient aspects of their self-concept than it is the case for White Americans. Furthermore, these behaviors and attitudes are regarded as repositories of African culture, or Africanisms, that have been preserved over the 300 years that blacks have lived in the United States. These Africanisms are theorized to have been preserved by Black Americans as part of their cultural heritage and for survival reasons. They are not thought to be utilized by Euro-Americans.

Parenthetically, Euro-Americans' survival techniques and strategies are thought to comprise a more individualistic strategy. Within the double consciousness model such an individualistic orientation has been conceptualized as being the province of the I self-referent. The self-concepts of both Euro-Americans and Afro-Americans are hypothesized to consist of an I self-referent. Within their self-

concept, the two groups differ in the extent to which an African world view, as espoused by we self-referent, is represented. In this case, Black Americans, rather than White Americans were hypothesized to house a more significant representation of the we self-referent.

Situational factors, such as the race of the person with whom an individual is interacting, were also hypothesized to influence the degree to which the we self-referent is manifested. For instance, in situations in which a black individual is interacting with other blacks the we self-referent is believed to influence more that individual's self-evaluation and self-perceptions than is the I self-referent. However, in situations in which a black individual is interacting with whites, a more individualistic posture of self-perception, (I self-referent), is assumed to have a greater influence on that person's perception of self than is the we self-referent. For the present study, two variables were postulated as influencing the degree to which the we self-referent is manifested: the racial awareness of the actor and the race of the person with whom the person is interacting.

The present study was designed to initiate empirical investigation of the double consciousness model. Specifically, the behavioral and attitudinal manifestation of the we self-referent was examined for black college and for white college females. These college females were asked to complete self-report measures. These measures were used

to assess the participant's self-perception of collectivism and other orientedness, and to heighten the subject's level of racial awareness. A bargaining type task was performed by subjects to assess the behavioral aspects of the we self-referent, namely cooperative behavior. Situational factors, which have been discussed as influencing the degree to which the we self-referent is exhibited, were also examined by varying the race of the person with whom each subject would perform the task and varying the level of racial awareness of the participant.

In interpreting the findings of the present study several factors must be considered in determining how these results influence the double consciousness model. First, the participants were females attending a predominantly white university. The degree to which the behaviors and attitudes expressed by these subjects are a function of their race, their sex, the racial composition of their university setting, or by a combination thereof is uncertain. However, these black subjects and white subjects shared certain experiences. They were relatively the same age and year in college, and their stability in length of neighborhood residency was comparable. Differences appear between the blacks and whites in the degree of interracial contact that is reported in their neighborhood and high school racial composition. Overall, blacks reported having more contact with whites than whites reported having with blacks. Also, differences in occupational status of black fathers and white

fathers were noted. Black fathers were more represented in the lesser professional and skilled manual professions, whereas white fathers were more represented in the major and minor professions. No differences were found in mother's occupations between black subjects and white subjects.

Given these subject demographic similarities and differences the results of this study should be interpreted as reflecting the experiences of females attending a predominantly white university in which the racial contact of the black females and the white females was not the same. These differences may be a factor that may influence attitudes reported and behaviors observed between races.

Discussion of Inter-group and Inter-rater Comparisons

Two kinds of analyses were performed on collectivism ratings: inter-group comparisons (e.g. comparison of how blacks rated Native Americans and of how blacks rated Hispanic Americans), and inter-rater comparisons (e.g. comparison of how blacks rated Native Americans and how whites rated Native Americans). The initial discussion will focus on inter-group comparisons for black subjects and for white subjects. Following this discussion, inter-rater comparisons will be discussed.

Inter-group Comparisons. The results of this study provide support for that aspect of the double consciousness model which asserts that black people perceive oppressed

groups as being more other-oriented or collective than they perceive non-oppressed groups. Specifically, the black females in this study rated oppressed groups, as a whole, significantly higher on collectivism than they rated non-oppressed groups, as a whole. In addition, black females' self-perception of collectivism was not significantly different from their perception of collectivism of Black Americans as a group. That is, blacks saw themselves like other blacks with respect to collectivism. However, their self ratings of collectivism were significantly higher than their ratings of collectivism of White Americans as a group.

In determining the degree to which black subjects' overall impressions of racial/ethnic groups, (not just their perception of collectivism for these groups), were similar, comprehensive ratings for these groups were computed. This comprehensive rating was the total score on the Semantic Differential. When such a comparison was made, black subjects were found to assign significantly higher (more positive) ratings to Black Americans than to White Americans.

Predictions were not offered in regard to white subjects' perceptions of collectivism for oppressed and non-oppressed groups. Consequently, findings related to white perceptions of collectivism serve to expand the theoretical sphere of the double consciousness model.

The results indicate that white subjects perceive oppressed and nonoppressed groups to be similar with respect to collectivism. Yet, on comprehensive ratings, these subjects rated White Americans more positively than they rated Black Americans. Also, white subjects' self ratings of collectivism were found to be significantly different from their ratings of collectivism of White Americans as a group. Thus, unlike black subjects, these white females did not perceive themselves to be like their racial reference group in regard to feelings of collectivism.

These findings suggest that white females' perceptions of collectivism for oppressed and nonoppressed groups do not differ as they do for black females. So, differentiation of racial/ethnic groups on this larger level (oppressed versus nonoppressed) does not appear to be significant for white subjects. What appears to be of more importance is the distinction between self and groups, including White Americans as a group. Noteworthy is the distinction made by white subjects between self perception of collectivism and perception of collectivism of White Americans as a group. However, in ratings that involve a more comprehensive assessment of group perception white females rated White Americans more positively than they did Black Americans. This suggests that white females do hold differentially positive perceptions of their racial reference group, but they perceive themselves as being more collective than White Americans as a group.

The double consciousness model also assumes that native Black Americans by virtue of their oppression in America and by virtue of their Africanisms would perceive individual oppressed groups as similar to how they perceive Black Americans, as a group. Consequently, when given an opportunity to rate a particular ethnic/racial group on collectivism, black subjects were expected to rate similarly other oppressed groups and Black Americans as a group. That is, when ethnic/racial groups labeled as socioeconomically oppressed are compared, as a unit, to ethnic/racial groups that are labeled socioeconomically nonoppressed, differences in ratings were expected. Namely, blacks were hypothesized perceive the oppressed groups as being more collective than nonoppressed groups.

The results of this study indicate that black subjects' and white subjects' perception of individual groups were unrelated to the particular group's ascribed status as oppressed or nonoppressed. That is, no differences were found in comparisons between oppressed and nonoppressed pairs on a rating of collectivism. Thus, contrary to expectation, the differences in the perception of collectivism by black subjects of oppressed and nonoppressed groups were not found to exist on an individual comparison level. So any differences that were noted in the rating by black subjects for oppressed ethnic/racial groups only differ significantly from those of nonoppressed groups when the ratings are pooled as a unit. For white subjects, this lack

of distinction between oppressed and nonoppressed groups was also found on the individual group level.

These findings suggest that on a multi-group level, that the concepts of "oppressed" versus "nonoppressed" may house more meaningful distinctions for blacks than for whites. However, the possibility must also be entertained that the differences in ratings for the oppressed versus the nonoppressed groups may have been a measurement effect, since this difference was observed only after pooling the scores for the individual oppressed groups and those of the individual nonoppressed groups. Consequently, more research is needed to determine the meaningfulness of the terms "oppressed" and "nonoppressed" for Afro and for Euro Americans.

Inter-rater comparisons. Thus far, the discussion has centered around inter-group comparisons. Cross race or inter-rater comparisons were also performed on self-ratings of collectivism and on individual group ratings of collectivism. No differences were found between the ratings of black subjects and white subjects on ratings of collectivism for themselves or for other groups.

Differences were found, however, between the self perception ratings of black and white females. Overall, black females' self perception was more positive than that of white females. This finding supports the literature that states that black females have a positive self perception. It also suggests that in a predominantly white university

setting that black females can maintain a positive self image.

The literature has not expounded on self perceptions of collectivism for black females or for white females. The results of this study indicate that these females' self perceptions of collectivism, as measured in this study, do not differ.

Cross race comparisons of self perceptions of other-orientedness were also made. Information was collected via the Self/Other Scale (Nobles, 1973) regarding the degree to which black subjects and white subjects expressed a general regard for and an acceptance of others. Overall, there were no differences found between blacks and whites in their self-perceptions of other orientedness. This finding supports the previously reported finding that black subjects' and white subjects self ratings of collectivism do not differ significantly.

Summary of inter-group and inter-rater comparisons.

In sum, similarities and differences have been noted for black and for white subjects in the attitudinal expression of the we self-referent. Both blacks and whites, when assessing their respective group on a variety of dimensions, viewed their group more positively than they did their racial counterpart. Consequently, both Black Americans and White Americans demonstrated an ingroup pride. Also, both blacks and whites rated themselves and other ethnic/racial groups similarly with respect to collectivism. These were the chief

similarities noted between the black females' and white females expression of we self-referent attitudes. There were two major differences noted. First, blacks perceived oppressed ethnic/racial groups, as a whole, as being more collective than nonoppressed ethnic/racial groups, but whites did not. Also, blacks perceived themselves as being like their reference group in relation to collectivism, and whites did not.

Given these findings, the we self-referent can be conceptualized as having at least two components; the general feeling or acceptance of others and an in-group/out-group orientation. This general acceptance of all people refers to a philosophical orientation that espouses that all people are one with the universe. The in-group/out-group orientation (us-them) refers to the tribe, a smaller, yet key aspect of one's existence. The results of this study indicate that blacks and whites express both of these attitudes and that they appear to be consistent across situations.

In addition, these findings call to question the importance of situational variables in determining the strength of an attitudinal representation of the we self-reference for black people. For these black subjects, situational variables were not significant factors in the expression of we attitudes. These subjects were blacks who were fairly sophisticated in their interactions with White Americans. This statement is made in light of reports

provided by these subjects as to the racial composition of their neighborhood and high school. Also, all of these subjects attended a predominantly white university and had spent at least one semester at this university. Consequently, situational hypotheses may depend on the level of contact or sophistication of the black person with White Americans. In those cases in which the level of contact is relatively high, situational variables are not thought to greatly influence other oriented attitudes. These hypotheses should be subjected to further empirical investigation.

Discussion of Task Performance

Participants were instructed to play the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in order to obtain a behavioral assessment of other-orientedness, and to provide clues as to the behavioral manifestation of the we self-referent. In this case, the subjects could choose either a cooperative or competitive strategy. The choice of a more cooperative strategy was hypothesized to be indicative of the behavioral manifestation of the we self-referent.

The game results provide clues as to the behavioral manifestation of the we self-referent. These results indicate that regardless of their level of racial awareness or the race of the person with whom they were interacting, black subjects' level of cooperation was about the same. This finding is contrary to the double consciousness notion

that the degree to which black people behaviorally express the we self-referent is situationally determined. Yet, it is congruent with the findings of the stability of we self-referent attitudes of black people. Also, contrary to expectation, whites were as cooperative as blacks. For whites, the degree of cooperation was the same across most conditions, with the exception of one. White subjects were more cooperative when their level of racial awareness was heightened and they were to perform the task with a white person. Under these conditions whites were most cooperative and their level of cooperation exceeded that of blacks. Thus, situational variables (in this case level of racial awareness and the race of the person with whom an individual is interacting), appear to have a greater impact on the behavior of the white females than on the black females. For white subjects heightening the racial awareness seemed to accentuate their sense of cooperativeness with other whites. However, for the blacks in this study these variables did not significantly alter their level of cooperative behavior.

Information was also collected to further understand the game process. Analysis of post-game questionnaire responses indicated that the white confederate was perceived as being more competitive than the black confederate. Furthermore, subjects either felt it was very easy or very difficult to maintain their strategy. These game results speak to the ascribed status of the white person in this

country. This status can be viewed in at least two ways. First, these results can be thought to indicate on the parts of both whites and blacks that White Americans are perceived in an I oriented fashion and thus are seen as more competitive. Consequently, in a task situation, where one can choose to be more cooperative or competitive, both whites and blacks may tend to choose to be more competitive with whites. Furthermore, in these situations, individuals do not typically have a neutral reaction to their white counterpart. It is either very easy or difficult to follow through on one's strategy. There is no middle ground. In some sense the combination of the presence of a white confederate, the nature of the game and the heightening of racial awareness suggested that "whiteness" was important.

Black subjects, however, regardless of race of partner, tend to perceive others as being more competitive. So regardless of their attitudinal stance of collectivism and other-orientedness, black subjects maintained a level of sensitization or vigilance with others. This has been addressed by Grier and Cobbs (1968) as "cultural paranoia". The present author prefers the phrase "healthy paranoia". This phrase, as does the one used by Grier and Cobbs, refers to "paranoia" or vigilance on the part of blacks as an adaptive behavior given their oppressive status in America.

Thus, for this group of black subjects, the level of cooperation observed may be healthy. Again, these lack

females had extensive exposure to white Americans and to white American's values and schema of self appraisal. Further, they attend a predominantly white university. For these black females to be any more cooperative or any less cooperative may be self-defeating. The idea that the individual's experiences shape the extent to which they demonstrate cooperative behavior or weness is most important in this case. It also raises the question of the extent to which an individual's level of oppression facilitates and to what extent it negates cooperative behavior. In this study, the level of perceived oppression was not measured, so the specifics of this question cannot be addressed. However, the data do suggest that blacks who have had a relatively high contact with white Americans perceive others in general as "the competition" rather than in an affiliative way. Behaviorally, this view is reflected in blacks behaving no more cooperatively than whites.

Given these findings the following statements can be offered about the behavioral component of the we self-referent:

- 1) Behaviorally, there is no difference in the level of cooperativeness of black and white females.
- 2) Whites appear to be more sensitive to situational cues in relation to cooperative behavior than are blacks. Specifically,

- whites are more cooperative than are blacks when their racial awareness has been heightened and they are interacting with a white person.
- 3) Blacks' level of cooperative behavior is relatively consistent across situations as is their self perception of collectivism.
 - 4) Blacks, regardless of other oriented attitudes and consistency in their level of cooperation performance with others, maintain a "healthy paranoia" in terms of their interactions with others.
 - 5) Blacks and Whites tend to equate more competitive or I oriented strategies with whites than with blacks.

Summary and Research Implications

In Chapter II, the double consciousness model was presented as being a useful way to conceptualize black self-concept. This model represents black self-concept as being comprised of three primary cognitive structures, the I, the me, and the we self-referents. The focus of the present research has been the investigation of assumptions that pertain to the nature of the we self-referent. These assumptions were 1) the we self-referent is more salient for Black Americans rather than for White Americans, and 2) the we self-referent reflects attitudes and behaviors that are both repositories of Black Americans' African

heritage and of the socioeconomic status experienced by black people.

The results of this study indicate that both black females and white females attending a predominantly white university behaved similarly and reported similar levels of other-orientedness and collectivism. These results suggest that the we self-referent may not be exclusively attributed to an individual's oppressive status in American society and should not be exclusively linked to sharing an African heritage. For the present, the manifestation of cooperative behaviors were not found to exist more for blacks than for whites. From this result it cannot be assumed that nonblack and nonoppressed persons have little representation of we self-referent attitudes and behaviors.

Despite similar behavioral outcomes, black females were experiencing different perceptions than white females of the white and black confederate with whom they were interacting. Overall, black females appeared to be less trusting and more vigilant during the task than were white females. This finding calls to question several issues. The first is the impact of the experimental setting on reported attitudes and behaviors. The second is the extent to which similar behaviors, attitudes and processes would be replicated by blacks with a different racial contact history from those blacks in this study. The third issue pertains to the differences in perception that accompany similar behavior for individuals with different backgrounds.

So, setting as well as racial contact has emerged as a key issue. The importance of these variables in discussing whiteness has emerged to be as central an issue for whites as it is for blacks. For example, in this study, white females' cooperative behavior was most significantly altered through heightening their sense of racial awareness and having them interact with other white females. More research needs to be conducted which determines those combinations of racial contact history and level of racial awareness that produce what kinds of behaviors for whites and what kinds of behaviors for blacks. Further exploration of these variables could assist in understanding the racial tension experienced in schools and work settings and may possibly help to address the psychology of extreme racial hate groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan.

However, according to the present results, for black females with a relatively high racial contact history attending a predominantly white university and for white females with a relatively limited racial contact history, as compared to that of black females, the behavioral and attitudinal expression of the we self-referent is similar. There was also support provided for the racial component of the we self-referent. This was evident through the expression of us-them, "tribe loyalty" attitudes by blacks and whites.

The role of womanhood and its impact on the results of this study should be discussed. The manifestation of similar attitudes for the group of students in this study could be due partly to their female status in this white male dominated society. Race was assumed to supersede gender identification in determining the degree of other-oriented behavior and attitudes for blacks and for whites. Because black females saw themselves like their reference group in relation to collectivism, it is less plausible that gender identification supersedes racial identification for this group. This may or may not be the cause for whites.

The data indicate that white females viewed themselves to be unlike "White Americans" in relation to collectivism. This suggests that the white females in this study may perceive themselves as a "collective" or "tribe" and that for these women gender identification may supersede race identification. Only women participated in this study. Therefore, any differences that may have existed between racial groups may have been counteracted by white females' sense of collectivism around womanhood, not around being a White American. This hypothesis is offered given the impact of the feminist movement on White American women. However, it is equally plausible that these white females viewed themselves as being different from "White Americans" as a group because they view themselves as individual

entities or autonomous beings who do not necessarily define self in relationship to their racial group. In this case the white females would be demonstrating more "I-oriented" attitudes and less "we-oriented attitudes". Consequently, viewing self as being separate from one's racial group or tribe comes the salient self-referent. Such an hypothesis also supports the racial differences notion of the double consciousness model.

The impact of one's sex on the attitudinal and behavioral expression of the we self-referent is more than a rhetorical question. It is a central issue in exploring the nature of the we self-referent. Research questions that emerge are as follows: "Do black males and white males manifest similar we attitudes and behaviors to those of black females and white females?" and "Does 'womanhood' for white women have the same type of valence as 'blackness' for black women as these terms pertain to perceived oppression?" Until questions such as these are addressed the total impact of gender as opposed to race on we self-referent attitudes and behaviors will remain clouded.

Overall, this research has highlighted the complexity and multidimensionality of the we self-referent. It has generated such questions as "Given their level of racial contact, is there an ideal level of collectivism or other orientedness for blacks?" "What is this optimal level?" "Was the level of cooperation observed in the present study representative of all black people, regardless of sex?"

From a practical standpoint it has been observed that black females and white females experience different attitudinal sets in responding to similar situational cues, yet present a similar outcome in regard to behavior. This finding significantly reinforces the idea that clinicians and researchers need to define their theories and research within the cultural purview of the people with whom it is to be applied. Furthermore, it reinforces the need for clinicians to re-examine the process behind observed behaviors and to re-evaluate their meanings for people of color and for other groups.

The double consciousness model is a model that strives for this goal by attempting to outline the parameters of the black self-concept, and by attempting to clarify the differences in the self-concept of black people and that of other groups. Important to this task is the notion that the cultural integrity of all groups be maintained in this exploration and that differences and similarities discovered be used to extend the mental health and prosperity of the respective group. In order for this to be a successful enterprise research must continue to clarify the cultural variables that impact self-concept. As these objectives are met they can ultimately be applied both at the individual and systems level to impact the nature of mental health intervention strategies.

APPENDIX A

A Cross Tabulation of Mother's Occupation as a Function of Subject's Race

<u>Subject's Race</u>	<u>Occupation</u>					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Black	2	10	4	13	0	1
White	1	9	6	7	1	0

$$\chi^2 = 4.09, df = 5, n.s.$$

Key:

- 1 = major professionals
- 2 = lesser professionals
- 3 = minor professionals
- 4 = clerical and sales employees
- 5 = skilled manual employees
- 6 = machine operators and semi-skilled employees

APPENDIX B

A Cross Tabulation of Father's Occupation as a Function of Subject's Race

<u>Subject's Race</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Black	2	8	8	2	9	0	1
White	9	3	16	4	0	1	0

$$\chi^2 = 21.01, df = 6, p \leq .01$$

Key

- 1 = major professionals
- 2 = lesser professionals
- 3 = minor professionals
- 4 = clerical and sales employees
- 5 = skilled manual employees
- 6 = machine operators and semi-skilled employees
- 7 = unskilled employees

APPENDIX C

Mean Ratings of Collectivism by Black Females of Ethnic/Racial Groups

<u>Ethnic/Racial Group Pairs</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>
Oppressed Nonoppressed	67.20 63.31	2.81**
Black American White American	16.60 15.28	1.62
Black American Hispanic American	16.60 17.02	.54
Black American Native American	16.60 16.98	.41
Black American Asian American	16.60 16.60	.00
Black American Jewish American	16.60 15.25	1.42
Black American Italian American	16.69 16.25	.04
Black American Irish American	16.60 16.15	.57
White American Hispanic American	15.28 17.02	2.16**
White American Native American	15.28 16.98	2.24**
White American Asian American	15.28 16.60	1.39
White American Jewish American	15.28 15.25	1.39
White American Italian American	15.28 16.25	1.46
White American Irish American	15.28 16.15	1.12

Appendix C Continued

<u>Ethnic/Racial Group Pairs</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>
Hispanic American Native American	17.02 16.98	.08
Hispanic American Asian American	17.02 16.60	.61
Hispanic American Jewish American	17.02 15.25	2.26**
Hispanic American Italian American	17.02 16.62	.69
Hispanic American Irish American	17.02 16.60	1.31
Native American Asian American	16.98 16.60	.39
Native American Jewish American	16.98 15.25	2.01**
Native American Italian American	16.98 16.25	.46
Native American Irish American	16.60 16.15	1.08 1.08
Asian American Jewish American	16.60 15.25	1.66
Asian American Irish American	16.60 16.62	.04
Jewish American Irish American	15.25 16.25	1.74
Jewish American Italian American	15.25 16.15	1.26
Italian American Irish American	16.62 16.15	.78
Myself Black American	17.15 16.60	.66
Myself White American	17.15 15.28	2.46**

N = 40

*p < .10

**p < .05

APPENDIX D

A Correlational Matrix of Ratings of Collectivism by Black Females^a of Different Groups

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Myself		-.09	.19	.14	.37**	.16	.06	-.04	.20
2. Black American			.07	.07	.02	.21	.09	.36**	.25
3. White American				.12	.38**	.03	.40**	-.01	.34**
4. Hispanic American					.51***	.46***	.40	.57***	.48***
5. Native American						.14	.38**	.39**	.22
6. Asian American							.45**	.64***	.70***
7. Jewish American								.44**	.57***
8. Italian American									.61***
9. Irish American									

^a_n = 40

*p < .10

**p < .05

***p < .01

APPENDIX E

Mean Ratings of Collectivism by White Females of Ethnic/Racial Groups

<u>Ethnic/Racial Group Pairs</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>
Oppressed	63.32	
Nonoppressed	64.25	.52
Black American	15.75	
White American	15.77	.03
Black American	15.75	
Hispanic American	15.77	1.25
Black American	15.75	
Native American	15.55	.27
Black American	15.75	
Asian American	15.75	--
Black American	15.75	
Jewish American	16.05	.38
Black American	15.75	
Italian American	16.75	1.71
Black American	15.75	
Irish American	15.68	.11
White American	15.78	
Hispanic American	16.28	.71
White American	15.78	
Native American	15.55	.30
White American	15.78	
Asian American	15.75	.03
White American	15.78	
Jewish American	16.05	.43
White American	15.78	
Italian American	16.75	1.46
White American	15.78	
Irish American	15.68	.13

APPENDIX E Continued

<u>Ethnic/Racial Group Pairs</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>t-value</u>
Hispanic American Native American	16.28 15.55	1.04
Hispanic American Asian American	16.28 15.75	1.04
Hispanic American Jewish American	16.28 16.05	.51
Hispanic American Italian American	16.28 16.75	.28
Hispanic American Irish American	16.28 15.68	.99
Native American Asian American	15.55 15.75	.21
Native American Jewish American	15.55 16.05	.55
Native American Italian American	15.55 16.75	1.61
Native American Irish American	15.55 15.68	.15
Asian American Jewish American	15.75 16.05	.28
Asian American Italian American	15.75 16.75	1.11
Asian American Irish American	15.75 15.68	.07
Jewish American Italian American	16.05 16.75	1.04
Jewish American Irish American	16.05 15.68	.39
Italian American Irish American	16.75 15.68	1.62
Myself Black American	17.32 15.75	1.95*
Myself White American	17.32 15.78	2.97**

N = 40

*p ≤ .10

**p ≤ .05

APPENDIX F

A Correlational Matrix of Ratings of Collectivism by White Females^a of Different Groups

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Myself		.18	.06	.05	--	.04	.32**	.36**	.06
2. Black American			.17	.83***	.55***	.18	.31**	.66***	.58***
3. White American				.24*	.39**	.22*	.10	.11	.32*
4. Hispanic American					.48***	.25*	.19	.64***	.69***
5. Native American						.49***	.16	.49***	.38*
6. Asian American							.05	.41**	.2
7. Jewish American								.35**	.0
8. Italian American									.59***
9. Irish American									

^an = 40
 *p < .10
 **p < .05
 ***p < .01

APPENDIX G

Mean Rating by Black Females and White Females of Collectivism Subscale of Ethnic/Racial Groups

Group	Mean Rating		t-value
	Black Females	White Females	
Myself	17.20	17.32	-.25
Black American	16.60	15.75	.90
White American	15.28	15.78	.70
Hispanic American	17.02	16.28	.82
Native American	16.98	15.55	1.30
Asian American	16.60	15.75	.71
Jewish American	15.25	16.05	-.81
Italian American	16.62	16.75	-.04
Irish American	16.60	15.68	.44
Oppressed	67.20	63.33	1.28
Nonoppressed	63.30	64.25	-.36

^a_n = 40
*_p < .05

APPENDIX H

Two-Way Analysis of Competitive Choices for Condition by Race of Experimenter

Source	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	F
Condition	7	90.76	1.60
Experimenter	3	16.17	1.20
Condition x Experimenter	21	66.90	1.18
Error	48	56.60	

*p $\leq$.05

APPENDIX I

Mean Number of Competitive Choices by Race of Subject for Two-Way Analysis of Condition and Race of Experimenter

Variables	Means
Condition	
Black Subjects	
Black Confederate-Order 1	36.10
Black Confederate-Order 2	33.10
White Confederate-Order 1	35.10
White Confederate-Order 2	34.50
White Subjects	
Black Confederate-Order 1	31.30
Black Confederate-Order 2	35.10
White Confederate-Order 1	27.10
White Confederate-Order 2	35.10
Experimenter	
Black Experimenter 1	33.78
Black Experimenter 2	34.11
White Experimenter 1	33.48
White Experimenter 2	32.45

APPENDIX J

QUESTIONNAIRES

Description of Self and Personal Beliefs Questionnaire

The purpose of this questionnaire is to help me to get to know you. The questionnaire will ask a number of questions about how you feel about yourself and other persons. There are different ways in which questions will be asked so each part will begin with a set of instructions. It is very important that you answer every question.

Your cooperation in this project is very much appreciated and strict confidentiality will be maintained. Again, thank you for your cooperation.

Deborah Sussewell

SELF/OTHER SCALE

The following list of statements attempts to measure some of your attitudes about interpersonal relations. There are no right and wrong answers for any of the statements. The best answer is naturally what you personally feel is true.

Please mark every statement using this scale:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 1 = strongly disagree | 4 = slightly agree |
| 2 = disagree | 5 = agree |
| 3 = slightly disagree | 6 = strongly agree |

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
1. I don't approve of doing favors for people. If you're too agreeable, they'll take advantage of you.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
2. If there is any criticism or anyone says anything about me, I just can't take it.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
3. I usually ignore the feelings of others when I'm accomplishing some important end.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
4. I look on most of the feelings and impulses I have toward people as being quite natural and acceptable.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
5. I like to have the feelings of security that comes from knowing I'm not different from others.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
6. I know I'm the person I pretend to be.	—	—	—	—	—	—		
7. I see no objection to stepping on other peoples' toes a little if it will help me get what I want in life.	—	—	—	—	—	—		

	Strongly disagree					Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
9. I feel neither above nor below the people I meet.	—	—	—	—	—	—	
10. I live too much by other stand- ards.	—	—	—	—	—	—	
11. I don't see much point to doing things for others unless they can do you some good later on.	—	—	—	—	—	—	
12. I seldom worry about other people.	—	—	—	—	—	—	

PERSONAL REACTION INVENTORY

Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Reach each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. If true, write T beside the statement; if false, write F beside the statement.

Remember: Answer each item as it pertains to you personally.

- ___ 13. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.
- ___ 14. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
- ___ 15. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
- ___ 16. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
- ___ 17. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
- ___ 18. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
- ___ 19. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
- ___ 20. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
- ___ 21. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would do it.
- ___ 22. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability.
- ___ 23. I like to gossip at times.
- ___ 24. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I know they were right.
- ___ 25. No matter who I'm talking to I'm always a good listener.
- ___ 26. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
- ___ 27. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.

- ___28. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
- ___29. I always try to practice what I preach.
- ___30. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
- ___31. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
- ___32. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.
- ___33. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
- ___34. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
- ___35. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
- ___36. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings.
- ___37. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
- ___38. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
- ___39. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
- ___40. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
- ___41. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
- ___42. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
- ___43. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.
- ___44. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.
- ___45. I never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

On the next page is a series of scales which we would like you to use in the assessment of the concept listed at the top of the scale. Your job is to place a checkmark (x) on the line closest to the adjective which best describes the concept. You should place only one "x" for each adjective pair. For example:

Flood

Kind x Cruel

If you think "A Flood" is more kind than cruel you would place your checkmark close to the left of the kind scale. If you are neutral or have no opinion you would place your mark in the center. If you think "A Flood" is cruel place your checkmark farther to the right.

Place one mark on each series of scales; do not omit any. If there is any question, ask the instructor for clarification. Work rapidly, do not spend alot of time on one item. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers.

MYSELF⁶

Unreliable	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Reliable
Smart	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Stupid
Pleasant	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Unpleasant
Unintelligent	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Intelligent
Violent	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Not Violent
Harmful	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Helpful
Sneaky	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Not Sneaky
Coward	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Brave
Predictable	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Unpredictable
Unfriendly	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Friendly
Urban	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Rural
Strong	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Weak
Competent	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Incompetent
Domineering	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Lax
Fast	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Slow
Active	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Passive
Bold	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Shy
Cruel	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Kind
Nice	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Nasty
Spiritualistic	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Materialistic
Prohibitive	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Permissive
Aggressive	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Not aggressive
Collective	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Individualistic
Excitable	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Calm
Motivated	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Aimless
Accepting	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Rejecting
Complex	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	Simple

⁶The same word pairs were used for the "Black American", "White American", "Hispanic American", "Native American", "Asian American", "Jewish American", "Italian American", and "Irish American" Semantic Differential Scales. Thus, those scales are not reproduced here.

PERSONAL DATA SHEET

Part I

Age _____

Ethnic identification: Black American/Afro American _____
 African _____
 White American _____
 Hispanic American/Hispanic _____
 Asian American _____
 Other (specify) _____

Year in College: _____

Major/Minor: _____

Parents' occupation: Mother _____
 Father _____

Part II

1) Of what city and state are you a permanent resident?

 How long have you lived there? _____

2) How long have you resided in your present neighborhood?

3) To the best of your knowledge, what is the racial
 ethnic composition of your present neighborhood? _____ %
 white; _____ % black; _____ % hispanic; _____ % asian.

4) To the best of your knowledge what was the racial/ethnic
 composition of your high school (when you were there)
 _____ % white; _____ % black; _____ % hispanic;
 _____ % asian.

Pre-Game Questionnaire

FOLLOWING ARE A LIST OF QUESTIONS. PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY. CIRCLE THE ANSWER WHICH IS MOST TRUE OR COMES THE CLOSEST TO DESCRIBING YOUR OWN BELIEFS.

1. Which of the following are you going to pursue during this task?
 - a. I am going to work to maximize my own gains. I will be concerned with gaining points for myself.
 - b. I am going to work for mutual gains. I will be concerned with gaining points for myself and with the other player also gaining points.
 - c. I am going to work to maximize my own gains and minimize the other player's gains. I will be concerned with gaining points for myself and with trying to minimize how many points the other player gains.

2. The rules for the task you are going to be participating in have been explained to you. Now think a minute about how much you think you want to do this task or prefer not to do it. For this question, your answer will be in the form of a rating which can range from 1 to 5. A rating of 5 means that you would like very much to do the task as described by the experimenter. A rating of 1 means that you would prefer not to participate in the task if you had a choice. A rating of 3, for example, would mean that you have no preference at all.

Circle the number which most accurately describes how you feel about this task,

1	2	3	4	5
prefer not to participate				prefer to participate

3. Which of the following goals do you think people in general would pursue while participating in this task?
 - a. Most people would work to maximize their own gains. They would be concerned only with gaining points for themselves.
 - b. Most people would work for mutual gains. They would be concerned with gaining points for themselves and with the other player also gaining points.
 - c. People would pursue a variety of goals; it is impossible to say which goal most people would pursue.
 - d. Most people would work to maximize their own gains and to minimize the other player's gains. They would be concerned with gaining points for themselves and with trying to minimize the points the other player gains.

Game Questionnaire

Player A

Player B

1. Which of the following best describes the goal that the other player is pursuing?
 - a. She is working to maximize her gains. She is concerned only with her points.
 - b. She is working for mutual gains. She is concerned with her points and with my points.
 - c. She is working to maximize her gains and minimize my gains. She is concerned with her points and with my points.

2. Which of the following best describes the goal that you are pursuing?
 - a. I am working to maximize my gains. I am concerned with my points.
 - b. I am working for mutual gains. I am concerned with her points and my points.
 - c. I am working to maximize my gains and minimize her gains. I am concerned with my points and her points.

Round # _____

Post-Game Questionnaire

1. Consider the entire task that you have just finished participating in. Which of the following best describes the goal the other player pursued?
 - a. He worked to maximize his own gains. He was concerned only with gaining points for himself.
 - b. He worked for mutual gains. He was concerned with his own points and with my points.
 - c. He worked to maximize his own gains and minimizing my gains. He was concerned with his own points and with my points.

2. Which of the following do you think most accurately describes the other player's behavior during this entire task? This question asks about "trustworthiness." Think of "trustworthiness" in terms of how the word is usually used (i.e., Webster defines it as "assured reliance on another's integrity, justice, etc."). Thus, "trustworthiness" does not involve just being predictable.
 - a. The other player tended to be trustworthy.
 - b. The other player was about equally trustworthy as untrustworthy.
 - c. The concept of trust is irrelevant to this game. This game has nothing to do with trust.
 - d. The other player tended to be untrustworthy.

3. Your answer for this question will be in the form of a rating which can range from 1 to 5. Circle the answer which most accurately describes who was responsible for how the relationship between you and the other player turned out.

1	2	3	4	5
I was mostly responsible		The other player and I were equally responsible		The other player was mostly responsible

4. In retrospect, which of the following goals did you pursue? That is, which of the following best describes the goal you actually pursued?
 - a. I worked to maximize my own gains. I was concerned only with gaining points for myself.
 - b. I worked for mutual gains. I was concerned with my own points and with the other player's points.
 - c. I worked to maximize my own gains and minimize the other player's gains. I was concerned with my own points and with the other player's points.

5. Which of the following do you think most accurately describes your behavior during this entire task?
- a. I tended to be trustworthy.
 - b. I was about equally trustworthy as untrustworthy.
 - c. The concept of trust is irrelevant to this game. This game has nothing to do with trust.
 - d. I tended to be untrustworthy.

6. Which of the following best describes the extent to which it was difficult or easy for you to maintain your original goal in view of the other player's choices?

1	2	3	4	5
Very easy		neither easy nor difficult		very difficult

7. Consider the entire task you have just finished participating in. Which of the following do you think the other player thought was your goal?
- a. He thought I was working to maximize my own gains. He thought I was concerned only with gaining points for myself.
 - b. He thought I was working for mutual gains. He thought I was concerned with my own points and with his points.
 - c. He thought I was working to maximize my own gains and minimize his gains. He thought I was concerned with my own points and with his points.
8. Do you think that your partners personality was compatible to your own? yes no

Debriefing Form

The purpose of this study was to assess individual's game playing strategies in light of their self-perception and their perception of others. That is, we wanted to learn more about how the way you think about yourself and the way you think about the person with whom you are interacting influences how you will play this kind of game, a game in which the outcome for each of you depends on both of you. To insure that all subjects experience the same playing strategy from the other player, the other player is a member of our research team and was provided a randomized playing strategy to follow. Are there any questions?

In trying to understand what you were experiencing throughout this experiment, I would like to ask you some questions?

- 1) Did you have any difficulty in answering the questionnaire? If so, what part gave you the most difficulty and why do you think it did give you difficulty. _____

- 2) Did you feel the game to be interesting or boring? _____

- 3) Were you actively thinking about the game strategy while playing the game? _____

- 4) Were you interested in knowing your total score after each round of ten trials? _____ Do you wish we had given the total score after each round of ten? _____
Would you recommend that we do so in future games? _____
Why? _____

- 5) For Hispanic condition only. Was it obvious to you that the person with whom you were playing is Hispanic? Why do you think that was so? _____

- 6) During this experiment, did you have any thoughts about the purpose of this study and were those thoughts difference from what I have told you? _____

We would appreciate it if you would not reveal the nature of our study to other students, since information about our study may tend to bias their performance and therefore, our results. Also if you are interested in obtaining an abstract of the results, please leave a permanent home address. We expect to finish the entire study, including data analysis by

December, 1980. If they are ready before that time they will be sent to you then. Again, thank you for participating.

QUESTIONS ADDED TO DEBRIEFING FORM AFTER THE PRE-TEST

- 7) FOR THE QUESTIONNAIRE FIRST CONDITION: Did answering the questionnaire first influence how you played the game? _____

- 8) FOR THE GAME FIRST CONDITION: Did playing the game first influence how you answered the questionnaire? Please Explain your answer. _____

- 9) Related to Question 6, we would like to know what you were thinking about before you played the game or answered the questionnaire? _____

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT
QUESTIONNAIRES

- 1) The "Self" items on the self/other scale are items 2, 4, 8, and 10. The "Other" items are 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12.
- 2) The items comprising the subscales of the Semantic Differential Scale are as follows:
 - a) Potency Subscale - Items: 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22.
 - b) Evaluation Subscale - Items: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 19.
 - c) Collectivism or Group Subscale - Items: 9, 20, 23, 26.
 - d) Activity Subscale - Items: 5, 15, 16, 24, 25, 27.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arnez, N. Enhancing the black self-concept through literature. In J. A. Banks & J. D. Grambs, (eds.), Black self-concept. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- Ausubel, D. Ego development among segregated Negro children. In J. Roberts (ed.), School children in the urban slum. New York: Free Press, 1967.
- Banks, W. The changing attitudes of black students. Personnel and Guidance Journal, 1970, 48, 739-745.
- Bem, D. J. Self-perception: An alterantive interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomenon. Psychological Review, 1967, 74, 183-200.
- Bem, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 6, New York: Academic Press, 1972.
- Berger, E. The relationship between expressed acceptance of self and expressed acceptance of others. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1952, 47, 778-783.
- Billingsley, A. Black families in white America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.
- Chein, I. The awareness of self and the structure of the ego. Psychological Review, 1944, 51, 301-314.
- Cooley, C. H. Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribners, 1902.
- Cross, W. E. Stages in the development of Black identity. American College Testing Program: Research and Development Division, 1972.
- Dales, R. & Keller, J. Self-concept scores among black and white culturally deprived adolescent males. Journal of Negro Education, 1972 (win), 4(1), 31-34.
- Dinklemeyer, D. C. Child development: The emerging self. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.
- DuBois, W. E. B. The souls of black folk, New York: Kraus-Thomas Organization Limited, 1953.

- Dubois, W. E. B. The Negro-American family. Atlanta: The Atlanta University Press, 1908.
- DuVal, S. & Wicklund, R. A. A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
- Erikson, E. H. The problem of ego-identity. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1956, 4, 56-121.
- Erikson, E. H. The concept of identity in race relations: notes and queries. Daedalus, 1966, 95, 145-171.
- Friedman, N. African and the Afro-American: The changing Negro identity. Behavioral Science Research Tuskegee Institute.
- Fromm, E. Escape from freedom. New York: Rinehart, 1941.
- Gitter, A. G. & Satow, Y. Color and physiognomy as variables in racial misidentification among children. Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, 1969, 4, 677-678.
- Goffman, E. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- Goldstein, C., Koopman, E. & Goldstein, H. Racial attitudes in young children as a function of interracial contact in the public schools. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1979, 49(1), 89-99.
- Goodman, M. E. Racial awareness in young children. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1952.
- Goodman, M. E. Evidence concerning the genesis of interracial attitudes. American Anthropologist, 1946, 48, 624-630.
- Greenwald, H. J. & Oppenheim, D. B. Reported magnitude of self-misidentification among Negro children- artifact? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 3, 3.
- Gregor, A. J. & McPherson, D. A. Racial attitudes among Negro children in a deep south standard metropolitan area. Journal of Social Psychology, 1966, 68, 95-108.
- Grier, W. H. & Cobbs, P. M. Black rage. New York: Basic Books, 1968.
- Hamachek, D. Encounters with the self. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1971.

- Herskovitz, M. L. The myth of the Negro past. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
- Hollingshead, A. B. Two factor index of social position. New Haven, Connecticut, 1957.
- Hraba, J. & Grant, G. Black is beautiful: A reexamination of racial preference and identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 398-402.
- Jersild, A. In search of self. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1952.
- Jones, E. E. & Nisbett, R. E. The actor and observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971.
- Jones, W. Principles of psychology. New York: Henry, Holt and Co., 1890.
- Jones, F. White racism and Africanity in the development of Afro-American communities. Paper presented at Annual Clinical Community Workshop, University of Maryland, 1976.
- Jones, J. M. Prejudice and racism. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1972.
- Kelley, H. & Stahelsk, A. Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16(1), 66-91.
- Kinch, J. W. A formalized theory of the self-concept. American Journal of Sociology, 1963, 68, 481-486.
- Kline, K. H. Goal choice, expectations about others' goal choice, and behavior of low and high machiavellians in the prisoners' dilemma game. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Maryland, 1973.
- Maslow, A. H. Motivation and personality. New York: Harper, 1954.
- McDonald, R. L. & Gynther, M. D. Relationship of self and ideal-self descriptions with sex, race and class of southern adolescents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 85-88.
- Mead, G. H. Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

- Messer, A. An identity crisis in Black Americans visiting West Africa. Mental Hygiene, 1971, 55(3), 375-381.
- Morland, J. A comparison of race awareness in northern and southern children. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1966, 36, 22-31.
- Moustakas, C. E. The self: Explorations in personal growth. New York: Harper, 1956.
- Meyers, G. Self. Pegasus, N.Y.: Western Publishing Co., 1969.
- Nobles, W. Psychological research and the black self-concept: A critical review. Journal of Social Issues, 1973, 29(1), 11-31.
- Nobles, W. Africanity: Its role in black families. Black Scholar, 1974 (June), 10-16.
- Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. T. & Tannebaum, D. H. The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.
- Pettigrew, T. F. Social evaluation theory: Convergence and applications. In D. Levine (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1967. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.
- Pinkney, A. Black Americans. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.
- Raimy, V. C. Self-reference in counseling interviews. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1948, 12, 153-163.
- Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. Prisoner's dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1965.
- Ridley, D. The study of black children's self-concept in relation to school achievement. Unpublished honors thesis, Brown University, 1976.
- Rogers, C. R. Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications, and theory. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Rogers, C. R. A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships, as developed in client-centered framework. In S. Kock (ed.), Psychology: A study of science. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 3, 184-256.
- Rosenberg, M. Conceiving of self. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

- Shrauger, J. & Shoeneman, T. Symbolic-interactionist view of self-concept: Through the looking glass. Psychological Bulletin, 1979, 8(3), 549-573.
- Sizemore, B. Social science and education for black identity. In J. Banks & J. Grambs (eds.), Black self-concept. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- Stevenson, H. W. & Stewart, E. C. A developmental study of race awareness in young children. Child Development, 1958, 29, 399-410.
- Toomer, J. Beyond being black: Identification alone is not enough. Journal of Negro Education, 1975, 184-199.
- Uwanno, J. & Stabler, J. Black and white as perceived by Euro-Americans, Afro-Americans and Africans. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1977, 44, 507-510.
- Wrightsmann, L. Measurement of philosophies of human nature. Psychological Reports, 1964, 14, 743-751.
- Wyllie, R. C. The self-concept. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, 1974.
- Wyne, M. D. The black self. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

APPROVAL SHEET

Title of Dissertation: A Cross Racial Study of Double
Consciousness Effects

Name of Candidate: Deborah Ridley Sussewell
Doctor of Philosophy, 1981

Dissertation and Abstract Approved:

Forrest B. Tyler

Forrest B. Tyler, Ph.D.
Full Professor
Department of Psychology

Date Approved: Dec. 2, 1981

CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: Deborah Ridley Sussewell.

Permanent address: 9004 Wallace Road, Lanham, Maryland,
20801.

Degree and date to be conferred: Ph.D., 1981.

Date of birth: December 3, 1953.

Place of birth: Washington, D.C.

Secondary education: DuVal High School, Lanham,
Maryland, June 1972.

Collegiate institutions attended	Dates	Degree	Date of Degree
Brown University	1972-1976	Sc.B.	June, 1976
University of Maryland	1976-1978	M.A.	Aug., 1978
University of Maryland	1978-1981	Ph.D.	Dec., 1981

Major: Clinical Psychology.

Professional positions held:

Staff Psychologist
Bay Cove High School
125 Lincoln Street,
Boston, Massachusetts, 02111
September 1, 1981 to present.

Pre-doctoral Clinical Internship Appointment
Teaching Fellow in Psychiatry,
Boston University School of Medicine
and the Professional Programs in
Clinical and Community Psychology
Boston City Hospital
818 Harrison Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts, 02118

Program Analyst,
Office of Program Development and
Accountability
Employment Standards Administration
Department of Labor
Washington, D.C.
May, 1980 to August, 1980.

Minority Coordinator
Psychology Department
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland 20742
January, 1979 to January, 1980.

Administrative Assistant
Institute for Urban Affairs and Research
2900 Van Ness Street
Washington, D.C.
May, 1979 to August, 1979.

Instructor
Psychology Department
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland, 20742
June, 1978 to August, 1978.

Team Member
Evaluation of Bowie Program for
Parents and Youth
Project Director
Dr. Edison Trickett
Psychology Department
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland, 20742
October, 1977 to May, 1978.